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the
States utility industry, faced with

years, the United
recent restructuring
massive
of traditional natural monopolies such as

telecommunications, natural gas, and electricity,' has raised a novel
argument in takings jurisprudence. With the onslaught of competition many United States infrastructure firms claim to have suffered

*Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. This Article is drawn from a paper prepared for a conference, Private Infrastructure for
Development: Confronting Political and Regulatory Risks, see infra note 6. The authors wish to thank Bruce Ackerman, Steven Bank, Julie Clugage, Joseph Dodge,
Larry Garvin, Timothy Irwin, Alvin Klevorick, Andrzej Rapaczynski, Mark Seidenfeld, Warrick Smith, Paul Stephan, and participants in a workshop at Yale Law
School for their helpful comments on a draft. Jonathon Rodden and Allison Turnbull
provided superb research assistance.
*Patricia A. Dore Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
Visiting Associate Professor, University of Texas School of Law, 2000-01.
1 See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323 (1998) (describing the deregulation of six core common carrier and public utility industries-railroads, airlines,
trucks, telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas).
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lost profits due to the past actions of government? These lost revenues, the firms argue, interfere with reasonable investment-backed

expectations and thus constitute a taking.3 "Deregulatory takings"
are not only used by the industry to press judicial claims against
state and federal regulators, they are also peddled to policymakers

in an effort to convince them to establish "transition" surcharges
that consumers or new market participants will be required to pay.'
While United States regulators and courts struggle with the

stranded cost issue, regulators and courts in developing countries
face a structurally similar issue: How does a state attract foreign

investment where there is some possibility that the commitments
behind its current regulatory regime may change? Like deregula-

tion in the United States, legal, political, and regulatory transitions
in developing countries pose political and regulatory risks' that

&

2See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract: The Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the United
States 8-9 (1997) ("[T]he predictable appeal that competition holds for legislators and
regulators should not obscure the fact that the transition from regulated monopoly to
competition, like the transition from dirty air to clean, is not free.... Electric utilities
alone may face $200 billion or more in 'stranded costs' as a result of the growth of independent power producers and the advent of wholesale and retail wheeling. That is
a public policy challenge at least as large as the savings and loan cleanup.") [hereinafter Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract]. The same argument is also made in J.
Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of ForwardLooking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1068 (1997) [hereinafter Sidak & Spulber, Givings],
and J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 851, 855 (1996) [hereinafter, Sidak & Spulber, Deregulatory Takings]. The notion of stranded costs and the legal argument for
recovery is discussed further at Part II, infra. The definition of stranded costs is discussed infra at note 82.
3
See Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at 4 ("Courts will soon
face a third genre of takings cases that will make the past analysis of regulatory takings seem simplistic by comparison.").
<According
to a recent study by Moody's Investors Service, "approximately $102
billion of stranded costs are expected to be taken care of.. . via regulatory and legislative processes." Moody's Investors Service, Special Comment, Smoke, Mirrors
Stranded Costs: How Stranded Cost Estimates Went from North of $130 Billion Dollars to $10 Billion, at 1 (Oct. 1999); see also Robert J. Michaels, Stranded Investment
Surcharges: Inequitable and Inefficient, Pub. Util. Fort., May 15, 1995, at 21 (addressing policy problems with stranded cost surcharges).
5 Louis T. Wells, Jr., defines political and regulatory risks as threats to the
profitability of a project that derive primarily from governmental action, rather than
from market conditions, such as economic factors. See, e.g., Louis T. Wells, Jr., God
and Fair Competition: Does the Foreign Investor Face Still Other Risks in Emerging
Markets?, in Managing International Political Risk (Theodore H. Moran ed., 1998);
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may undermine investor confidence, at great cost to those countries' economies. 6 Also, like investors in the United States utility
industry, direct foreign investors in infrastructure projects in developing countries are increasingly seeking recovery of their
realized and anticipated losses in domestic and international legal
tribunals.
In both instances-the United States stranded cost problem and
the development of standards to protect direct foreign investment

in developing countries-the claims for protection are novel, since
traditional legal regimes do not adequately provide for the type of
remedy sought. Thus, courts are in need of standards to assist them
in determining when a change in regulation warrants recovery for
investors. How courts fashion these standards and remedies is of

great consequence. For most countries the private infrastructure
Louis T. Wells & E.S. Gleason, Is Foreign Infrastructure Investment Still Risky?,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 44. Similarly, Sidak and Spulber isolate the
stranded cost issue as an "endogenous" change in governmental policy, separating it
from "exogenous" shocks dues to changes in technology or economic conditions. Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at 437.
6 See Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, Political Risk and Infrastructure Investment (Aug. 1999) (paper presented at Private Infrastructure for Development:
Confronting Political and Regnlatory Risks, international conference sponsored by
the World Bank Group and the Government of Italy, Sept. 8-10, 1999, Rome, Italy
[hereinafter Private Infrastructure for Development]) (presenting evidence that reduced risks will increase investment levels, but risks are highly correlated with microlevel institutional reforms, such as overlapping veto points, an independent judiciary,
and independent regulatory agencies), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html
/fpd/risk/papers/henisz.pdf; Mirjam Schiffer & Beatrice Weder, Catastrophic Political
Risk Versus Creeping Expropriation: What Determines Private Infrastructure Investment in Less Developed Countries? (Aug. 1999) (draft paper, Department of
Economics, University of Basel, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association)
(finding that the most robust indicators of private infrastructure investment are low
political and electoral uncertainties, low expectations of expropriation, and a high
level of political rights).
7 Examples include Pakistan's renegotiation of contracts with power generators, Enron's Dabhol power agreement in India, and the fall of Suharto in Indonesia. See Part
III, infra. With the growth of international investment, the number of disputes is proliferating across the world. For example, in Argentina the French Vivendi are pitted
against the Tucuman provincial government over a water project, Houston Industries
Energy is in a dispute with provincial regnlators in Santiago del Estero, and international operators of the main Buenos Aires Port have charged that the government has
given unfair advantages to a rival port. See Andreas Mandel-Campbell, Trade Disputes Sour Argentine Privatisation, Fin. Times (U.S. ed.), June 12, 1998, at 7;
Argentina's Model Port Sell-Off Beginning to Lose Its Lustre, Fin. Times (London
ed.), Mar. 3, 1998, at 8.
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sector is central to broader public policy goals, including health,

education, and welfare policy.' A failure by courts to fashion the
appropriate- balance between flexibility and compensation could

have serious implications for current and future investment as well
as for government policy.

Any commercial enterprise is subject to changes in the state's
tax and regulatory laws, but these risks loom especially large for infrastructure industries. Infrastructure projects involve considerable

risk for private investors because of the high levels of fixed capital
and the long payback periods. Because infrastructure industries

supply basic services, government is likely to remain involved in
the industry in spite of a commitment to privatization and the entry
of private suppliers. Thus, investors face not just ordinary commercial risk, but also risks that flow from the actions of the state itself.
Some see the relationship between the state and regulated firms
as essentially contractual-describing it as a "regulatory contract"
that imposes quite specific duties on the state, in a manner identical to a contract between private parties.9 In reality, the situation is

usually closer to the "relational contracts" described by Oliver Williamson" where many of the terms are poorly specified because of
the complexity of the underlying environment and the long-term

nature of the relationship." In a competitive contracting environment, the risks would be divided between state and firm in a way
that reflects their relative abilities to diversify and control the level

of risk." Diversified private businesses may be the'most efficient
risk-bearers in many cases because they are able to spread risk

8

See, e.g., OECD, Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Telecommunications Environment (1995).
9 See Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at 101 ("State public utility regulation of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution and of local
telephony represents a contract between the state and the regulated company. The
economic functions of the regulatory contract, as well as the legal duties and remedies
associated with it, are identical to those of a contract between private parties.").
1 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233, 238 (1979); Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms
of Governance 54-87 (1996) (discussing the relational contract framework).
1See Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell J. Econ.
426,444 (1976).
12 See Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law
and Economics of Implicit Contracts, 11 J. Reg. Econ. 41,48 (1997).
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among their investors and over their various enterprises. 3 In con-

trast, the state is likely to be best able to limit the risks that arise
from its own actions. Efficient contracts are difficult to write because the entity best able to diversify is' not always the same as the

one best able to limit the level of risk. 4
This Article focuses on the protections for infrastructure inves-

tors provided by the United States Constitution's Takings Clause
and on the wisdom of incorporating such protections into the constitutions of other nation states. The Takings Clause is an example
of a state-established background norm that limits the government's ability to undermine the profitability of private property. In
the United States, this norm is an implicit term in every contract
and provides a kind of guarantee against certain types of state ac-

tions. The state is required to pay compensation when it "takes"
property for public use.

There is little dispute that the Takings Clause applies to outright
government seizure or expropriation of physical property. But the
allocation of the costs imposed by government regulatory or deregulatory activity is the subject of much heated debate. In the
extreme, some argue that any action by government that negatively

affects private property rights should count as a taking. Others exclude regulatory actions from the reach of the Takings Clause

1Along these lines, a recent study finds that "creeping expropriation"-in the form
of regulatory corruption, arbitrary changes in general rules, and general uncertaintyis less important than political risk for infrastructure investors. The credibility of the
rulemaking process, however, does matter. See Schiffer & Weder, supra note 6.
14Infrastructure firms have a number of contractual methods of responding to the
risks emanating from state action. These range from project finance to joint ventures
to special tax breaks and subsidies provided by host governments. International and
national bodies provide guarantees and insurance, and contracts are written so that
disputes are resolved in international fora using the law of developed countries. See,
e.g., Gerald T. West, Political Risk Investment Insurance: A Renaissance, J. Project
Fin., Summer 1999, at 27; Nina Bubnova, Guarantees and Insurance for Reallocating
and Mitigating Political and Regulatory Risks in Infrastructure Investment: Market
Analysis 2-3 (Aug. 1999) (paper presented at Private Infrastructure for Development,
supra note 6), available at httpl/www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/risk/papersfbubnova.pdf;
Louis T. Wells, Private Foreign Investment in Infrastructure: Managing Noncommercial Risk 12-14 (Aug. 1999) (paper presented at Private Infrastructure for
Development, supra note 6), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/risk
/papers/wells.pdf. We do not deal with these techniques here except to note that
individualized contracts can either complement or undermine the constitutional provisions we discuss.

1440

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 86:1435

except in rare cases, such as when the state completely destroys the
owner's use of his or her property. The actual state of American
law cannot be reduced to a set of principles consistent with law and
economics analysis. In the land use takings context, courts have
done a poor job of articulating principled decisions. As United
States courts evaluate the novel "deregulatory takings" claims,
they should avoid taking a turn toward the ad hoc approach that
characterizes much takings jurisprudence. Similarly, developing
countries should carefully approach the issue of constitutional protections for direct foreign investment, applying a principled
approach in balancing the protection of investors against the need
for policy flexibility.
The approach we recommend distinguishes between government as purchaser and government as policymaker-a clear
presumption in favor of compensation should govern in the former
case, and a presumption against compensation should apply in the
latter. We argue that this distinction is appropriate both under the
United States Constitution and in emerging economies that wish to
incorporate a property clause into their constitutions. The details
of the doctrine might vary across regimes, but the basic principle
seems a useful way to frame the debate.
Part I will briefly summarize United States takings jurisprudence
with a focus on infrastructure industries. Land use takings cases

decided by the Supreme Court over the past several decadesparticularly landmark decisions in 1987, 1992, and 1994-leave the
disposition of many regulatory takings cases subject to a highly unprincipled approach. By contrast, since the New Deal, utility
regulation cases have been decided under a separate set of precedents that are predictable in both their reasoning and outcome. As
Part II will argue, awarding compensation for the stranded costs of
utilities undermines the precedential value of decisions addressing
takings in utility regulation. We challenge the view that utility takings cases, especially in a deregulated environment, should be
treated the same as land use takings cases. Part III will denionstrate the structural and economic similarities between United
States takings law and the protection of infrastructure projects in
developing countries. As in the United States, public utility firms
and investors in developing countries are turning to courts to pro-
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vide the stability that the political and regulatory regimes of the
host governments often lack.

In Part IV, we will present a principled understanding of takings
jurisprudence in the infrastructure context. Because the commercial and political-economic issues have a global reach, our

framework is designed to assist United States courts as well as
judges and constitutional reformers in developing countries that

are trying to establish a credible legal framework for capital investment. For both deregulatory takings and direct foreign

investment, courts need to be wary of the ad hoc approach that has
characterized United States land use takings jurisprudence. Commentators addressing deregulatory takings focus almost exclusively
on the efficiency of the government's regulatory decisions. A more
complete analysis of the problem disentangles cases where the

government is a purchaser of property from cases where it is a
policymaker. We will seek to defend our claim that the government should be constitutionally required to pay compensation
when it plays the role of buyer and be required to pay only limited
compensation when its actions can be characterized as policymaking. Our conclusions and recommendations seek to strike a realistic
balance between requiring investors to take account of government

activities in planning their own actions and requiring the government to pay for the inputs it uses.
I. UNrTED STATES TAKINGS LAW AND
INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES

The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution requires
government to pay compensation under certain conditions and

thus limits the government's ability to impose costs on property
owners. Central to the analysis are the complex questions of what

firms can be said to have contracted for and what obligations the
state should accept if it seeks to further investment without sacrificing political legitimacy. The key legal and policy issue is how to
draw the line between the preservation of "investment-backed expectations"" and the preservation of government flexibility. An
1 The phrase originated with Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L.

Rev. 1165,1213 (1967).
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economic analysis of takings law does not imply that everyone

harmed by government actions should be compensated. Such a
conclusion would only result from a strong normative commitment

not to efficiency, but to the status-quo distribution of property
rights.
A. Takings Law and Land Use

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.16 According to Justice Hugo Black, the
"Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [i]s designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."" In implementing this design, the Supreme Court has required compensation when tangible things are taken directly by the
government, but has often refused compensation where the owner
merely suffers a diminution in the value of his property. Easy
cases, which require compensation, occur when the government
physically invades a farmer's land by building a highway through
his cornfield or condemns a private individual's house site for use
as a public swimming pool. Hard cases, which do not usually generate compensation, arise when a superhighway keeps a gas station
intact but provides no exit ramp nearby or constructs a noisy sports
stadium next to an apartment complex." Once a "taking" is found,
the level of compensation is to be set at "fair market value," but if
the owner disputes the state's judgment on this matter, it is a court,
not the market, that sets the price.19

16 U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."). Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the clause applies to
state governments as well as the federal government. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512

U.S. 374, 383-84 n.5 (1994) (citing Chicago B & Q R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226,239 (1897) (extending the Takings Clause to the states)).
17 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
"See Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 113-67 (1977)
(presenting and critiquing this view); Andrea Peterson, The Takings Clause: In
Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1299, 1305-41 (1989) (arguiug that the Supreme Court has been
neither clear nor consistent in its analysis of the Takings Clause).
1See
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-76 (1943). Some states depart from
this approach, allowing property owners to recover a portion of the gain in value at-
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Compensation is denied when the complainant cannot legitimately claim to be entitled to the benefits that are lost when the
government acts.20 For example, American courts have found that
individuals do not have the right to create a nuisance under common law and cannot claim compensation for laws that limit
nuisances."1 In practice, United States courts have not limited
themselves to common law nuisances but take a broader view of

the behavior that can be regulated without impinging on property
rights.' Compensation questions are resolved without giving a ca-

nonical status to the private law.
tributable to a public project. See, e.g., Department of Transp. v. Nalven, 455 So. 2d

301 (Fla. 1984); Calhoun v. State Highway Dep't, 153 S.E.2d 418 (Ga. 1967).
20 In upholding a fee charged to Sperry Corporation for use of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, the Supreme Court found that "Sperry has not identified any
of its property that was taken without just compensation." United States v. Sperry

Corp., 493 U.S. 52,59 (1989).
21 As the Supreme Court has stated, "[A]ll property in this country is held under the
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) (quoted by Justice John Paul Stevens in
his opinion in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488-89
(1987), and in his dissent in First English Evangelical Church v. County of L.A., 482
U.S. 304,326 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2See Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 48-50 (1964). In
Kansas a constitutional amendment prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors and thus made brewery property valueless. The Supreme Court denied a
firm's claim for compensation in broad language:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the
public is not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized
society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State must
compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by
reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict
injury upon the community.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669. Some Justices accept the broad reading of state power implied by this quotation while others would read the nuisance exception quite narrowly
to accord more closely with common-law doctrine. For example, Justice Stevens
quoted this passage in two recent cases, while then-Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that "[t]he nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous with
the police power itself." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 145
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is instead a "narrow exception allowing the government to prevent 'a misuse or illegal use."' Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)). A similar contrast
in views is evident in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the state had taken an "essential stick[] in the
bundle of rights," id. at 831 (Scalia, J.), while Justice William J. Breunan found that
the owners had no legitimate claim. See id. at 856-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to address the
regulatory takings issue in the land use context in recent years, but
its jurisprudential position is far from clear. Some commentators
purport to find a pattern.' However, the cases do not appear to
represent orderly doctrinal development.2 4 Since the Court's 1978
decision in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York,"

the Court has approached regulatory takings as "essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries."' In deciding whether a regulatory taking has occurred, the Court has focused on balancing three factors: the
"character of the governmental action," the extent to which the action interferes with "distinct investment backed expectations," and
the degree of diminution in value."

In the nineties the Court continued the trend of ad hoc balancing in the broad range of regulatory takings cases.' In 1992, the
See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1988).
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 1697 (1988) [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery]; Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Regulatory Takings: Policy Analysis and Democratic Principles, in
Taking Property and Just Compensation: Law and Economic Perspectives of the Takings Issue (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992) [hereinafter, Rose-Ackerman, Regulatory
Takings]. Rose-Ackerman argues that there is no consistent theory behind the cases
decided in the 1987 and 1988 terms: Nollan, First English, Keystone, and Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) was decided
the next year. The takings cases decided in the 1990 term did not clarify Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the regulatory takings issue. The first case, Preseault v. ICC,
494 U.S. 1 (1990), dealing with the status of private landholders' claims when a rail
bed is used as a hiking trail, was judged not ripe for decision. The plaintiffs were required first to pursue their suit in the Court of Claims. A concurrence by three
Justices, including Sandra Day O'Connor and Scalia, who both dissented in Pennell,
argued that in determining whether a taking has occurred state law should determine
the character of the property entitlement. See id. at 20-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The second case, Sperry, concerned a fee charged by the government for use of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal that was judged a user fee, not a taking. See
Sperry, 493 U.S. at 59. In 1992 the Supreme Court held in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), that "when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."
Id. at 1019. As is discussed infra, however, the Lucas test does not address the issue of
partial takings, which is often the case in the regulatory takings context, and still requires significant ad hoc adjudication regarding the nature of the nuisance exception.
u 438 U.S.104 (1978).
6 Id. at 124.
r Id.
2 For a fuller treatment of this issue that reaches the same conclusion based on earlier cases, see Peterson, supra note 18, at 1304 ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a body of
2

2See
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Supreme Court attempted to bring formalism and predictability to
its takings jurisprudence with its decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.29 Lucas holds that there is a presumption that
regulatory action that totally eliminates the economic value of private property is a taking." Although representing a victory for the
property owner, the decision does not articulate a per se rule for
partial regulatory takings cases and leaves a broad gray area where
courts must struggle to adjudicate.3 ' Even in total deprivation
cases, the Lucas majority left open two broad categories of exceptions: uses of private property that contravene "existing rules or
understandings," as defined in state law; 2 and the "nuisance exception," allowing for deference to government action intended to
address key public health, safety, and welfare concerns." Inquiries
case law in greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray."); see also Richard A. Epstein,
Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 21, 21 (1997) ("The law of takings, with its ever expanding subject matter, is a
sprawling affair with little intellectual coherence."). In a later article, however, Peterson argues that "takings decisions can best be explained by saying that a compensable
taking occurs whenever the government intentionally forces A to give up 'her property, unless the government is seeking to prevent or punish wrongdoing by A."
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles. Part
II-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78
Cal. L. Rev. 53, 59 (1990). She argues that the federal courts define wrongdoing by
looking to "societal judgments." Id. at 86. The courts themselves have failed to supply
a consistent rationale for their decisions, but she is able to infer one from an evaluation of the outcomes. Peterson's analysis is purely positive. Even if she is correct as a
descriptive matter, however, we would still argue for the reformed approach outlined
in this Article.
29505 U.S. 1003 (1992). For criticism of Lucas, see William W. Fisher, III, The
Trouble With Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 (1993); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and
Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 77, 118-27 (1995); John A. Humbach,
Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1

(1993).
o Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, articulated that "confiscatory regulations"
require compensation unless the governmental limitation somehow inhered in the title to land itself, "in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
31
Here, the ad hoc *balancing approach of Penn Central continues to apply. See
David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on
Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Centralto Dolan and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 523, 575 (1999).
n Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28,1030.
33See id. at 1027. Although the Court recognized the intersection of nuisance law
and takings jurisprudence over a century ago, in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887), "the Lucas majority transformed the nuisance exception into a true, categorical exception to the Takings Clause." Scott R. Ferguson, The Evolution of the
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'

regarding "existing rules and understandings," as well as the definition of "nuisance,"' create substantial uncertainty for lower courts,
which need to define the scope of these exceptions on a case-bycase basis.3
In 1994, the Court handed down its decision in Dolan v. City of
Tigard," another substantial victory for the owner. Dolan continues and expands upon the Court's application of a due process test
that would invalidate land use regulations "not substantially advanc[ing] legitimate state interests."" Although an earlier case had

required an "essential nexus" between the dedication of property
and a legitimate state interest,' Dolan demands only "rough proportionality" between the dedication and the impacts of the
proposed development.3 9 Taken together, Lucas and Dolan might
be seen as the Court responding to prior requests for "a good dose
of formalization,"' but the application of the cases is narrow and
both cases leave substantial issues to be adjudicated. Thus, it is
questionable whether the post-1987 cases have changed much in
the Court's ad hoc approach; at best, they stand for a symbolic
formalism of limited applicability."
"Nuisance Exception" to the Just Compensation Clause: From Myth to Reality, 45

Hastings L.J. 1539, 1553 (1994).
3In his majority opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia noted that relevant factors in
assessing a nuisance include
the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property,
posed by the claimant's proposed activities, the social value of the claimant's
activities and their suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike ....
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31. Such nuisances must be recognized under preexisting
state law, see id. at 1029, and the application of nuisance principles must be "objectively reasonable." Id. at 1032 n.18.
3See
Robert Meltz et al., The Takings Issue: Constitutional Limits on Land-Use
Control and Environmental Regulation 189 (1999); Humbach, supra note 29, at 1213.

- 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
3 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980).
3 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
3As
Justice Rehnquist stated, the Dolan test goes beyond the nexus required by
Nollan, focusing on "whether the degree of the exactions demanded... bears the required relationship to the projected impact" from the proposed development. Dolan,
512 U.S. at 388.
4 Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery, supra note 24, at 1700.
4 See Gregory S. Alexander, Ten Years of Takings, 46 J. Legal Educ. 586, 594

(1996).
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By inviting additional takings claims, the recent cases will ensure that the ad hoc approach continues. In fact, the approach of
lower appellate courts continues to be ad hoc. Consider, for example, how lower courts are adjudicating the issue of the "relevant
parcel"-the relevant increment of property for purposes of analysis under the Takings Clause. If, for example, a developer owns

nine acres of land, divided into three equal but neighboring (separately purchased) parcels, and the development potential of one
acre confined to a single three-acre parcel is destroyed due to government classification as a wetland, it is uncertain what the

relevant parcel is. A court must assess whether the relevant parcel
for takings analysis is the one acre of wetlands, the three-acre parcel containing the wetland, or the entire nine acres. In Florida
Rock Industries v. United States,3 the Federal Circuit reversed and
remanded a lower court's finding of a taking, suggesting that the

relevant property interests be construed to limit takings claims, including government actions that destroy part of the land's value to

the claimant.' The Federal Circuit has consistently embraced an ad
hoc, fact-based inquiry into the relevant parcel.5
The Supreme Court seems to be inordinately proud of the ad
hoc nature of its takings opinions and has reiterated its support of
case-by-case balancing in recent opinions. For example, Chief Jus-

tice William H. Rehnquist argues that "questions arising under the
Just Compensation Clause rest on ad hoc factual inquiries, and

must be decided on the facts and circumstances in each case." 6

4 In Dolan the Court stated, "We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation... ." Dolan, 512
U.S. at 392.

418 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.1109 (1995).
"See id. at 1572.
4 See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.1554 (2000); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d
796 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A test using fact-specific criteria for determining the relevant
parcel was articulated by the U.S. Claims Court in Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl.

Ct. 310,318 (1991).
4Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Similar language is found in Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) ("There is no abstract or fixed
point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate.
Formulas and factors have been developed in a variety of settings. Resolution of each
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One of the only exceptions occurs in a partial dissent by Justice
Antonin Scalia, attempting to articulate a theory of takings law. 7
The Supreme Court's glorification of ad hoc balancing is impossible to reconcile with its interest in preserving investment-backed
expectations,' especially when the investments are long lived and
special purpose. To preserve investment-backed expectations, takings law should be predictable so that private individuals can
confidently commit resources to capital projects. Predictability
does not, of course, require compensation in all cases. It only requires that investors be able to predict what might or might not
happen. As many economically oriented writers have argued, no
taking can legitimately be claimed if the property owner anticipated that an uncompensated state action was possible and if this
belief affected the price paid for the asset. Property values "are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power," according to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.9 No government could or should indemnify investors against all of the
hazards of business life.
case, however, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic.") (citations omitted).
4 See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 16 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
4 Frank Michelman's view that Takings Claims should preserve "investmentbacked expectations," see Michelman, supra note 15, is supported by Penn Central,
where the Supreme Court endorsed "interfere[nce] with distinct investment-backed
expectations" as one factor in its ad hoc assessment of regulatory takings. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978); see supra text accompanying note
27. In addition to Penn Central, Michelman's position has been picked up by the Supreme Court in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). See also
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493, 499 (considering investment-backed expectations in analysis of potential regulatory taking).
4 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
5 For another example, consider the German Constitution under which the right to
hold property is guaranteed but "property imposes duties" and its use shall "serve the
public weal." Grundgesetz art. 14(2). Property may be taken by the state but only for
a public purpose and only if compensation is paid. See Grundgesetz arts. 14, 19; see
also David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 291-99
(1994) (summarizing German takings law); Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 250-66 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing
leading Constitutional Court Cases); A.J. van der Walt, Constitutional Property
Clauses: A Comparative Analysis 121-63 (1999) (summarizing Germany's constitutional property clause). Compensation is required to avoid imposing undue sacrifices
on individuals for the sake of the common good. See BVerfGE 24, 367 (1968), in
Kommers, supra, at 250-52; see also van der Walt, supra, at 130-31 (comparing the
German approach for determining when compensation is required with the Austrian
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The problem of judicially created uncertainty is exacerbated by
the ex post nature of court decisions. Federal judges are reluctant
to decide cases until someone has "actually" been harmed. Not
only are judges reluctant to articulate general principles of takings
law, but they are also unwilling to make general rulings on the
status of state actions under individual statutes.5 1 In the field of
regulatory takings, where the future direction of the law is unclear,
economic actors cannot obtain a prospective ruling from the court
on whether a particular law will effect a taking. They must wait until a concrete harm has occurred before the statute can be tested.
In the face of this uncertainty, investors may forgo otherwise profitable activities, and thus, the current state of the law may produce
an inefficiently low level of investment. 2

If takings jurisprudence is both ad hoc and ex post, investors
may have a very difficult time knowing whether a particular state

action will or will not be judged a taking. Therefore, even if the
menu of possible state actions is known and probabilities can be asand Swiss approaches to this issue). However, because of the social obligations of
property ownership, the state can impose some limitations on the use of property
without having to pay compensation. Property owners do not have a right to create a
public nuisance, but the noncompensable restrictions go beyond the prevention of
harm to others. A range of regulatory restrictions has been found not to raise takings
claims. See Currie, supra, at 294-96. Older understandings of property rights can be
modified by law so long. as owners had time to adjust to the new state of affairs. See
BVerfGE 58, 300 (1981), in Kommers, supra, at 257-61; see also Van der Walt, supra,
at 142 (discussing this case).
5
Thus, in Keystone, Justice Stevens dismissed Justice Holmes's analysis in Pennsylvania Coal of the general validity of the act as an "advisory opinion." Keystone, 480
U.S. at 484. Justice Stevens then went on to argue that no taking had occurred under
the similar Pennsylvania law at issue in Keystone because at the time of the lawsuit no
company could actually demonstrate that it had been harmed. See id. at 495-96. The
companies were asking the Court to pass on the general legitimacy of the statute,
which the majority declined to do. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, was willing to do this.
He argued that in Pennsylvania Coal the general validity of the act "was properly
drawn into question." Id. at 507 (Relmquist, C.J., dissenting). Similarly, in Pennell, an
association of landlords was given standing to challenge a portion of San Jose's rent
control ordinance, but their claim that a taking had occurred was dismissed as "premature" because no landlord had actually suffered harm from the disputed provision.
Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 5-11 (1988). The partial dissent, in contrast,
would have reached the merits of the takings claim. See id. at 16-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
n In contrast, the constitutional systems in some other countries permit constitutional courts to rule on the content of controversial doctrines in "abstract norm
control" actions that do not require one to wait for the presentation of a concrete
case. On the German system, see Kommers, supra note 50, at 13-14.
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signed to each policy, investors will not be able to make informed
choices because the Court has not given them clear standards to
determine when compensation will be paid. The shifting doctrines
of takings law introduce an element of uncertainty into investors'
choices that has nothing to do with the underlying economics of
the situation. This uncertainty creates two problems. First, investors do not know whether damages will be paid. Second, in the
event damages are not paid, investors may be left bearing the costs
of an uninsurable risk. The investment-backed expectations discussed in the American cases are themselves affected by the nature
of takings law. To the extent that investors are risk averse, the very

incoherence of the doctrine produces inefficient choices.
Investors are not the only ones adversely affected by the incoherence and unpredictability of takings law. Government officials
may be affected as well since the vagneness of the doctrine may act
as a force for conservatism among public officials. Risk-averse officials facing the possibility of compensation suits against their
jurisdictions may restrict their activities simply because they dislike

uncertainty. As Justice John Paul Stevens notes:
It is no answer to say that "[a]fter all, if a policeman must know
the Constitution, then why not a planner?" To begin with, the
Court has repeatedly recognized that it itself cannot establish
any objective rules to assess when a regulation becomes a taking. How then can it demand that land planners do any better?"

In short, the ad hoc nature of the Court's opinions is itself troubling and is impossible to reconcile with a belief in the importance
of preserving investors' expectations, especially for infrastructure
investments that are long lived and special purpose. To the extent

that investors are risk averse, the very incoherence of judicial doctrine produces inefficient choices. American courts are interpreting
a constitutional provision, justified as a way to reduce risks for investors, in a way that increases uncertainty. This is hardly a model
for governments in emerging markets that are searching for a legal
template.

3
1 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 341 n.
17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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B. Regulatory Takings in InfrastructureIndustries
In infrastructure industries, compensation obviously would be
required under the United States Constitution if the government
expropriated the assets of a private power company or a port facility to use as a nationalized facility. Of course, nationalizations
seldom occur in the United States, but requiring compensation in
such cases is an easy application of existing law. Similarly, if a government sought to attract investment by offering cleared parcels of
privately-owned land to investors, it would have to compensate
those whose property was destroyed in the process.
In contrast, construction of a state-owned facility that competes
with a private firm would be unlikely to trigger the Takings
Clause.' The electric power projects constructed by the government-owned Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") are a case in
point. Many private utilities (as well as coal and ice companies)
challenged TVA on the ground that government-produced electricity would cause irreparable economic harm to them.
Constitutional challenges against TVA were mounted, but the appellate courts rejected these challenges. Although not expressly
framed as takings cases, a trial court hearing a series of challenges
by nineteen utilities took the position that the utilities were threatened with future economic harm; however, the court also noted
that the injury would be damnum absque injuria unless TVA itself
were unlawful.

54
Government competition is not as uncommon in the United States as it may seem:
Many local governments provide utility services, such as electricity and cable television, to their citizens. Municipal territory expansion or outright municipalization may
lead government to compete with private firms in the provision of services.
-5 The court reasoned,
Since the United States has acquired these dam sites and constructed these
dams legally, the water power, the right to convert it into electric energy, and
the energy produced constitute property belonging to the United States. This
electric energy may be rightfully disposed of .... While the Government, in
selling property of the United States, performs many functions that would be
performed in the operation of a private business trading in similar property,
inasmuch as the energy sold is created at dams lawfully erected within the
Federal power, the Government in performing these functions is not entering
into private business. It is merely using an appropriate method of disposing of
its property. The Government may sell land belonging to the United States in
competition with a real estate agency, carry parcels in competition with express
companies, and manage and control its thousands of square miles of national
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In considering this matter on appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned,
The local franchises, while having elements of property, confer
no contractual or property right to be free of competition either
from individuals, other public utility corporations, or the state
or municipality granting the franchise. The grantor may preclude itself by contract from initiating or permitting such
competition, but no such contractual obligation is here asserted."

Competing private power projects were not compensated for their
loss of business.
The interaction between the state and private infrastructure pro-

jects is not limited to the possibility of nationalization, which
requires compensation, or state competition, which generally does
not. Because infrastructure firms frequently have monopoly power
in the markets where they operate, public regulation is a condition
for such firms to operate at all. 7 But over time changes in regulatory policy can become more or less favorable to the regulated
industry. This produces a set of takings law issues that cannot be
characterized as either nationalization or state competition with
private firms. If public regulation limits the value of someone's
property, should the Takings Clause entitle the owner to obtain
compensation? Conversely, if firms obtain windfall gains as a result
of government action, should they be required to turn them over to

the state?
In the case of infrastructure regulation, particularly of utilities,
takings law challenges have produced a line of opinions that is
largely distinct, in terms of both precedential value and reasoning,
from other regulatory and land use takings cases. The courts treat
parks even as a private company. The Government has an equal right to sell
hydro-electric power, lawfully created, in competition with a private utility.
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 21 F. Supp. 947, 960-61 (E.D. Tenn. 1938) (cita-

tions omitted), aff'd, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
"Id. at 139 (citing Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837) and other cases). For discussion of the TVA cases, see George D. Haimbaugh,
Jr., The TVA Cases: A Quarter Century Later, 41 Ind. L.J. 197 (1965); Joseph C.
Swidler & Robert H. Marquis, TVA in Court: A Study of TVA's Constitutional Litigation, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 296 (1947).
"Property values "are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power," according to Justice Holmes. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260

U.S. 393,413 (1922).

2000]

DisentanglingDeregulatory Takings

1453

these cases separately from other takings cases because most utilities are subject to government regulation of prices. Since the New
Deal, takings cases addressing utility price regulation have been
much clearer-and better justified-than the ad hoc line of opinions addressing takings in the land use regulation context.
In the early days of utility regulation at the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court endorsed a "fair value" test, an
approach that thrust courts into the business of valuing utility rates
on substantive due process grounds." Much like the current line of
land use cases, these early ratemaking cases, decided largely during
the Lochner era,' took an ad hoc approach to adjudicating
whether government-set rates were constitutional. During that era,
ratemaking controversies were arguably "[t]he most significant
cases in the Court's campaign to expand the definition of property
and takings."" The cases of the period have been described as ad
hoc and unpredictable, leading to "endless litigation" and calling
into question the role of courts in reviewing economic matters.61
The Court repudiated this activist position in the 1940s, adopting
instead an "end results" test. In Federal Power Commission v.
Hope Natural Gas Co.,. the Court indicated that it would focus on
the result rather than the method of ratemaking. According to Justice William O. Douglas, "It is not the theory but the impact of the
rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot

See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466,546-47 (1898).
See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960, at
160-61 (1992); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the
Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 Va. L. Rev. 187, 216-23
(1984); see also Robert L. Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?, 55
Harv. L. Rev. 1116,1120 (1942) (arguing that ascertaining value under Smyth calls for
analysis of several enumerated factors unrelated to value).
0Molly
S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner Modem Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 605, 616 (1996).
61 Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1535, 1556-57
(1999); see also Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276, 299-301 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the gradual realization that calculations rested on shifting theories); John Bauer, The Establishment
and Administration of a "Prudent Investment" Rate Base, 53 Yale L.J. 495, 498-501
(1944) (noting that objections to the standard were premised on indefiniteness and
difficulties of application and administration); cf. Gerard C. Henderson, Railway
Valuation and the Courts (pt. 2), 33 Harv. L. Rev. 1031, 1051 (1920) (describing the
fair value rule as a "juristic myth[]").
S320 U.S. 591 (1944).
m
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be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at an
end."' This approach is consistent with the New Deal Court's repudiation of Lochner and its generally deferential judicial review
of economic regulations."

The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this deferential approach to
reviewing utility price regulation in every case decided since 1944.
In Market Street Railway v. Railroad Commission,'5 the Court refused to require compensation where the government did not
authorize full recovery of the costs of obsolete technology." Later,
in the PermianBasin Rate Cases,'7 the Court rejected a challenge to

the Federal Power Commission's ability to set area-wide rates, reasoning that there is no constitutional obligation to determine
individual rates on a cost-of-service basis. The most recent ratemaking case considered by the Court, Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch," upheld a lower court's disallowance of non-"used and
useful" nuclear assets and expressly reaffirmed Hope: "[T]oday we
reaffirm these teachings of Hope Natural Gas."" Although the
Court frequently does review the procedures used by regulatory

bodies, it continues to be reluctant to review the economic reasoning behind regulatory decisions involving public utilities.
Three rationales, which are not as prominent in the land use
context, explain the Court's deferential approach to utility rate-

making takings cases. First, the ratemaking process is self
correcting. Regulators may underestimate the cost of capital in one
year, but through modifications in a later year, they can correct any

Id. at 602.
See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (signaling a shift towards
more deferential judicial review, upholding regulated prices so long as they have a
"reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrarynor discriminatory").
6

6

324 U.S. 548 (1945).
"See id. at 557, 564-65 (1945) (deferring to regulators' decision not to allow recovery of San Francisco street cars and bus lines valued by regulators at less than onethird the amount at which they would have been valued using historical or reproduction costs).
67 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
6 See id. at 769.

m 488 U.S.299 (1989).
70 Id. at 310.
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deficiency in utility earnings and revenues by adjusting cost of capital." Hence, judicial review does little to increase accuracy.
Indeed, there may be significant costs to judicial review of utility
ratemaking, given its complex technical nature. A second rationale
for deference to regulators' decisions is that judicial review of

ratemaking "impose[s] high error costs and high judicial resource
costs."' Courts do not have nearly the same expertise or access to
complex accounting and economic information as do regulators,
and are more prone to embrace a "science charade" as they review
complex technical matters." This not only creates a high cost for
courts, but the uncertainty it creates may deter regulators from
innovating or slow the pace of regulatory change.
Third, the political process provides adequate protections for
utilities and their investors. Utility ratemaking and other regulatory processes, which tend to be transparent and well developed,
provide a forum for regulators to balance the interests of investors,
firms, consumers, and the state. According to Richard Pierce,
Detailed judicial review of ratemaking has little, if any, effect in
constraining the political process.... [T]he "end result" test
announced in Hope can be seen as a decision to allocate to the
political institutions of government near total power to protect
the constitutional values underlying the takings clause in the
ratemaking context. This is required by the severe institutional
limitations of the judiciary as a potential source of protection of
those values.74
Since legislators and regulatory officials are more politically accountable than judges, judicial interference with regulators'
decisions may thwart democratic values. Courts are best left to review the quality of regulators' decisionmaking process, not the
substance of their decisions.
For these reasons, we argue that in utility regulation controversies-including controversies about deregulation-courts should

71

See Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Regulation of Public Utilities: Theory and Prac-

tice 196 (3d ed. 1993).
a Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 Geo. L.J. 2031, 2046 (1989).
7 E.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Tort Risk Regulation, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 1613 (1995).
7
Pierce, supra note 72, at 2046.
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use the deferential approaches of cases like Hope, Market Street
Railway, PermianBasin, and Duquesne as opposed to the more activist review approach of the recent land use takings cases. Justice
Black's articulation of the purpose of regulatory takings-"to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the

public as a whole""-is not a central concern in utility regulation.
As Richard Goldsmith argues, "Rate regulators do not allocate
burdens between the 'public' on the one hand and the 'few' on the

other," but balance "the cost of utility service between large classes
of investors and consumers."76 It would be particularly odd to invoke takings protections to the advantage of investors and the
utility industry since here-unlike in the land use context-they
have an overwhelming advantage in information, wealth, and political power and "boast a superior ability to bear risk and to
mitigate damage from unforeseen contingencies-the precise eco-

nomic attributes that justify the imposition of liability in virtually
every other legal context."" In fact, given their institutional disad-

vantage in promoting political accountability, courts generally
defer to regulators and avoid active involvement in the policing of
utility rate regulation.
This is not to suggest that the Takings Clause is without any application to utility price regulation. In Duquesne, the Court
expressly recognized that there is a constitutional limit in setting
utility prices: If regulators threaten the financial integrity of a utility or provide inadequate compensation to current equity owners
for the risks associated with their investments, they may effectuate

a taking.79 Although lower courts occasionally raise such concerns,'

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
Richard Goldsmith, Utility Rates and "Takings," 10 Energy L.J. 241, 255 (1989).
" Chen, supra note 61, at 1558-59.
7 See Pierce, supra note 72, at 2046.
79
See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 312 (1989) ("No argument has
been made that these slightly reduced rates jeopardize the financial integrity of the
companies, either by leaving them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their
ability to raise future capital. Nor has it been demonstrated that these rates are inadequate to compensate current equity holders for the risk associated with their
investments under a modified prudent investment scheme.").
8See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
810 F.2d 1168,1181-82 (D.C. Cir.1987) (reversing and remanding the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's ("FERC") disallowance of unamortized nuclear investment
7

76
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the Supreme Court has not applied these limits in the utility rate
setting context, and its cases over the past fifty years do not suggest
any eagerness to engage in a more activist review of utility pricesetting. In fact, despite Duquesne's anticipation that takings claims
may legitimately be asserted against regulators' price-setting, some
lower courts interpret the cases as allowing a significant public interest to justify the financial destruction of a regulated utility.8
However, a new issue has now arisen in the regulation of United

States public utilities-widespread deregulation. As deregulation
of utility industries proceeds apace, a self-correcting and relatively
stable regulatory process is no longer the norm. Without such a
process, stakeholders in the industry are increasingly pressing

claims based on land use takings cases, threatening the certainty
that has characterized this line of opinions for the past fifty years.
We turn now to consider how this issue of deregulatory takings is
being framed in the context of the restructuring of United States
public utility markets.

II. THE STRANDED COST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
Many American infrastructure industries currently face increased
competitive pressures through restructuring and deregulation. This
has produced a new set of takings law claims, largely untested in
United States courts. Utilities assert that deregulation has produced "stranded costs." The definition of stranded costs is by no
means settled because it is a term with both legal and political implications for utilities and governments. Indeed, the term itself has
a normative loading that may hinder an objective assessment of the
problem. By calling costs "stranded" those who argue for compenfrom the rate base for failure to provide an explanation); id. at 1188-89 (Starr, J. concurring) (arguing that a "reasoned consideration" of investor interests requires more
than a mechanical application of rules but requires consideration of what expectations
exist under a regulatory compact).
81See Gulf State Utils. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 578 So. 2d 71, 106 (La.
1991) (holding that a taking will be found only when the state "failed to consider the
legitimate interests of the utility and its investors in a higher rate of return, and to
weigh those interests against the competing concerns of the ratepayers"), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1004 (1991); Ohio Edison Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 589 N.E.2d 1292,
1300 n.8 (Ohio 1992) (boldly asserting that "'the Constitution no longer provides any
special protection for the utility investor"') (quoting Dayton Power & Light Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 447 N.E.2d 733, 740 (1983), quoting Neil N. Bernstein, Utility
Rate Regulation: The Little Locomotive that Couldn't, 1970 Wash. U. L.Q. 223,259-60).
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sation imply that the costs are "shipwrecked"-that is, investors
are the victims of misadventure brought about by government action. Economically, stranded costs occur when the costs to the
incumbent exceed the costs to new entrants because of the actions
of the state, not because of changes in technology or other exoge-

nous economic shocks. These costs reflect the fact that some
investments cannot earn a fair rate of return in the deregulated
marketplace.'

Initial estimates of stranded costs in electrical utility deregulation in the United States ranged from $34 billion to $210 billion,
according to one report.' Given these large estimates, pressures to

provide the industry recovery of some, if not all, of these costs are
obvious. The United States Energy Information Administration
estimated that stranded costs could lead to an increase in bank-

ruptcies in the industry if regulators did not address them.' Not

&

* Sidak and Spulber define stranded costs as the "inability of utility shareholders to
secure the return of, and a competitive rate of return on, their investment." Sidak
Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at 29. Sidak and Spulber's definition includes operating expenditures required by regulators as well as capital investments.
Brennan and Boyd identify four types of stranded costs in the electric power sector:
1. Undepreciated investments in power plants that are more expensive than
generators available today. 2. Long-term contracts-most if not all mandated
by the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA)-with high-priced
independent generators, mostly using renewable energy technologies. 3.
Generators built but not used, primarily nuclear. 4. Expenses related to
"demand-side management" (DSM) and other conservation programs that, as
substitutes for new plant construction, were charged to the generation side of
the business.
Brennan & Boyd, supra note 12, at 45 (footnote omitted). Other definitions focus
more on capital outlays and do not necessarily include other expenses. Herbert Hovenkamp defines stranded costs as "investments in specialized, durable assets that
may have seemed necessary, or at least justifiable, when constructed and placed into
service under a regime of prices and entry controls but that have become underutilitized or even useless under deregulation." Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause
and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108 Yale L.J. 801, 802-03 (1999). Jim Rossi
focuses on assets that are unable to recover their remaining capital costs after deregulation. See Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 297,301-02

(1998).
8 These estimates represent the after-tax discounted present value of the reduced
&

contributions to cost recovery. See Eric Hirst & Lester Baxter, How Stranded Will
Electric Utilities Be?, Pub. Util. Fort., Feb. 15, 1995, at 30-32, cited in Brennan
Boyd, supra note 12, at 45-46.
&See U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Electricity
Prices in a Competitive Environment: Marginal Cost Pricing of Generation Services
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surprisingly, utilities are making vigorous policy arguments in favor
of full or near-full recovery of stranded costs. A recent study suggests that utilities have used political and regulatory processes to
obtain recovery in many states. Moody's Investors Service now estimates that stranded costs will total just $10 billion.' In 1995 they
estimated these costs at $130 billion." According to their estimates,
$102 billion of the reduction in the total was due to regulatory and
legislative relief.
In recent years, the argument for stranded cost recovery has
moved beyond policy to take on the rhetoric of legal entitlement,
invoking the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution. Although the cases regarding the regulation of utility prices are deferential to regulators, rate regulation
is not the same as the deregulation of a formerly regulated industry
where a competitive market will displace the regulator in setting
prices. In such contexts, "deregulatory takings" challenges asserting interference with "investment-backed expectations" may still
and Financial Status of Electric Utilities: A Preliminary Analysis Through 2015, at xvi

(1997).
8 See Moody's Investor Service, supra note 4, at 1.
9 See id.
87 See id. The study is summarized in Andrew Taylor, Debate on U.S. Deregulation
Hots Up, Financial Times, Survey: World Energy (London Ed.), Dec. 8, 1999, at 1.
Some states are even allowing for stranded cost recovery even though they have not
implemented retail competition in electricity. Florida, for example, has adopted a
wait-and-see approach to retail deregulation of the electric utility industry. See Electric Restructuring: Before, During and After, Pub. Util. Fort., Nov. 15, 1999, at 26
(comments of Florida Public Service Commission chairman Joe Garcia). Although
postponement of deregulation has kept the stranded cost issue off the public political
agenda, regulators have quietly allowed utilities to accelerate depreciation and recovery of power plants. By the time Florida deregulates the industry, some utilities will
have recovered the costs of their plants, so the stranded cost issue may not materialize. For example, Florida Power and Light has struck a deal with state regulators that
allows it to accelerate $100 million a year in depreciation expenses for plants over the
next three years. See Rate Deal Brightens Outlook for FPL; Utility Has Better Deal
Against Competition, Sun-Sentinel, Mar. 28, 1999, at 1F, available in Lexis (noting
that "FPL has been able to speed up these reported reductions of its plants through a
special agreement with state regulators that was set to expire at the end of the year.
The idea behind this was to reduce the company's exposure to 'stranded costs,' or
money spent on power plants 'that won't be recovered when greater competition
leaves the older assets obsolete"); see also Florida P&L Dodges a Rate Case with
Deal to Cut Rates $1 Billion Over Three Years, Electric Util. Wk., Mar. 15, 1999, at
13 ("FP&L was also directed to accelerate depreciation of its nuclear and fossil assets
by $100-million each year, which is down from the average of $250-million a year the
PSC allowed during the past four years."), available in 1999 WL 12165227.
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arise. According to J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spulber, who advocate a legal entitlement to recovery of stranded costs in the

United States:
The competitive transformation of local exchange telecommunications and the electric power industry raises significant
questions about whether regulators should give a public utility
the opportunity to recover its stranded costs. As regulators
mandate the unbundling of basic network elements in local telephony or mandate wholesale and retail wheeling in the
electricity industry, they introduce competitive rules that potentially deny incumbent utilities the opportunity to recover the
cost of service. While competition presents incumbents with
opportunities to serve customers in new ways, regulators often
leave untouched the utility's preexisting incumbent burdens.
Such regulatory action threatens to confiscate private property-shareholder value-for the promotion of competition,
without just compensation."

Those arguing for widespread compensation claim both that the
government has made an implicit (if not explicit) contract with the
utilities to guarantee them a competitive rate of return on their

capital and that it has induced them to invest on those terms. 9 If
deregulation lowers the expected value of the firm's assets, these
commentators claim that a breach of contract has occurred that
violates the Contracts Clause of the Constitution and may also
amount to an unconstitutional taking of property.

Implicit in this deregulatory takings argument is the suggestion
that courts should turn away from the deferential review of Hope,
Market Street Railway, and Duquesne towards the more rigorous
review seen in recent land use decisions-if not a complete return

to Smyth v. Ames." Sidak and Spulber's approach gives central importance to the investment-backed expectations variable in the ad
hoc Penn Central calculus. According to them, investment-backed

expectations do "all the heavy lifting in a regulatory takings case.""
In addition, Sidak and Spulber cite in support of their argument

s Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at 19.
8 See id.
9 See Chen, supra note 61, at 1536.
91 Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at 224.
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many of the Court's recent land use takings cases, including Lucas
and Dolan.'
Given the many doctrines implicated, the legal argument for recovery of stranded costs warrants critical examination. We begin
with a critique of the claim that the Contracts Clause of the United
States Constitution requires compensation. We then focus on the
Takings Clause. We argue that courts should not turn away from
the deferential approach to review that has characterized their takings jurisprudence in the public utility context since Hope.

However, to the extent that courts do look to 'land use takings
cases as an analogy in evaluating deregulatory takings, under a
framework presented later in the Article, we argue that only limited compensation of stranded costs is warranted.

A. The Contracts Clause
The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution reads:

"No State shall ...

pass any ...

Law impairing the Obligation of

Contracts ... ."" Although the clause is sometimes read to apply
only to private contracts, a considerable body of case law and academic commentary applies the clause in some fashion to contracts
between the state and private individuals and firms." Even for
those who would give the clause a strong reading, the protection is
not absolute. The Takings Clause permits the state to condemn
property it has conveyed by contract so long as it pays just com-

pensation.9 5 Richard Epstein views both the Takings Clause and
the Contracts Clause as protections against rent seeking and political intrigue. According to him, if government wants to take action,
it must compensate the losers unless it can justifiably invoke the
police power. 6

9See
id. at 250 (citing Lucas's "invigoration of regulatory takings law" in support of
more rigorous judicial review of state commission interconnection pricing determinations); id. at 2,219 n.14 (citing Lucas); id. at 255-56 (discussing Dolan).
93

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, ci. 1.

See Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 703, 718-21 (1984); Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at
9

145,161.
95 See Epstein, supra note 94, at 719.

96 See Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Do-

main 178-81 (1985).
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There are two problems with this view. First, even in Epstein's
own terms, it ignores the possibility that the original contract may
itself have been the result of a rent-seeking deal. Perhaps a person
with powerful political connections or a willingness to bribe ob-

tained the contract from compliant officials. "White elephant"
infrastructure projects are archetypal examples of rent seeking by
politicians and private investors. Epstein's "police power" exception may be designed to cover this case, but he does not develop
the argument fully.
Second, Epstein takes an overly narrow view of legitimate government. He wants a broad range for compensation and complains
that one important case is "far too muddy in leaving open the possibility that contracts could be impaired if the impairment were

'reasonable and necessary' to accomplish some important public
purpose."" His skepticism of government actions leads him to be
more protective of private parties who contract with government
compared with those involved in private contracts.
We express a more nuanced view. We agree that when government has made an explicit contract with a private party, the
economic argnments for treating the contract as analogous to a

private contract are strong. Under the Contracts Clause, the state
cannot unilaterally void a particular contract unless it pays dam-

ages analogous to those faced by private parties." However, the
state can take actions that affect a multitude of contractual rela-

tions without being accused of "impairing the obligations of
contracts." For example, it can enact a general tax increase or can
change policy so that an industry faces new regulatory costs.

The application of Epstein's view to regulated public utilities is
particularly problematic. Even when there is no explicit contract,

some, including Sidak and Spulber," have suggested that the relationship between a utility and the state is based on an implied

9 Epstein, supra note 94, at 720 n.45; see United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that the Contract Clause prohibits the retroactive repeal of a
statutory covenant made between the states of New York and New Jersey to limit the
ability of the Port Authority to subsidize rail passenger transportation from revenue
and reserves).
9 The exception would be the case in which the present govermnent argues that no
valid contract exists because of corruption or obvious indicia of unconscionability.
9See Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at 101-77.
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regulatory contract. Judge Kenneth Starr wrote in a concurrence to

a D.C. Circuit case:
The utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly
on service in a particular geographical area (coupled with stateconferred rights of eminent domain or condemnation) is
granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of intensive regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free market.
Each party to the compact gets something in the bargain. As a
general rule, utility investors are provided a level of stability in
earnings and value less likely to be attained in the unregulated
or moderately regulated sector; in turn ratepayers are afforded
universal, nondiscriminatory service and protection from monopolistic grofits through political control over an economic
enterprise.
Borrowing from this notion, Sidak and Spulber see failure to compensate utilities for stranded costs as analogous to a breach of
contract against the industry."

Notwithstanding such statements, there is little legal support for
viewing the relation between private firms and the regulatory
agencies as analogous to private contracts. Sidak and Spulber discuss historical situations concerning bridges and public works
where explicit contracts existed.1 2 They also refer to United States

v. Winstar Corp., 3 a recent case in which the Supreme Court decided that the United States government could be sued for

breaching contracts that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had
signed with thrifts to encourage healthy th-ifts to merge with failing ones during the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.10 However,
Winstar does not support their view. The ruling reaffirmed the unmistakability doctrine-that promises by the government to forgo
certain types of future regulatory action will be enforced by courts

1Jersey
Cent. Power & Light v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 810 F.2d
1168,1189 (D.C. Cir.1989) (Starr, J. concurring) (citation omitted).
1 See Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at 179 ("Given that the
utility incurred its costs under the regulatory contract, the opening of the utility's
market to competition-that is, the termination of the exclusivity of the utility's franchise-is a breach of a material term of that contract if not accompanied by an
offsetting removal of incumbent burdens.").
1See id. at 140-60.

1 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
1

See Sidak & Spulber, Regulatory Contract, supra note 2, at 171-77.
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only if these are set forth in unmistakably unambiguous language,
which a plaintiff bears the burden of proving." Classic cases, such
as Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,1' in which the Court refused to imply a protection against new competitors for a chartered
bridge, advise against recovery.'" In the general case of a regulated
public utility, there'is no explicit contract guaranteeing the firm a
set rate of return on each specific investment. Instead, there is
nothing but a history of statutes and regulatory orders. From these
alone, it is difficult to infer ex post what the firm's legitimate expectations might have been.'"
Furthermore, even if one is convinced that the relationship
should be seen as contractual, it does not follow that Epstein's view
of the obligations of the state must be accepted. One could make
an argument that deregulation is a policy believed to have broad
social benefits and that the regulated firms should not be protected
from the costs of moving to this policy. One would then read the
contracts as failing to protect the firms from the costs of having to
face a competitive environment. In other words, contracts with the

0 Winstar can hardly be said to represent a judicial consensus on the issue. Although Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Stephen Breyer joined the portion of Justice
David Souter's plurality opinion that recognizes a general exception to the unmistakability doctrine for government indemnification agreements, see id. at 871-87
(plurality opinion), five justices rejected this exception. Justices Anthony Kennedy
and Clarence Thomas joined in a concurrence by Justice Scalia, see id. at 919-24
(Scalia, J., concurring), and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See id. at 924-31. For further discussion of Wiustar and its implications for government contract defenses, see Gillian
Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Govern-

ment, 8 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 467, 479-88 (1999); Michael P. Malloy, When You Wish
Upon Winstar: Contract Analysis and the Future of Regulatory Action, 42 St. Louis
U. L.J. 409 (1998); Joshua I. Schwartz, Assembling Winstar: Triumph of the Ideal of
Congruence in Government Contracts Law?, 26 Pub. Cont. L.J. 481 (1997); Thomas J.
Gilliam, Jr., Note, Contracting With the United States in its Role as Regulator: Striking a Bargain with an Equitable Sovereign or Capricious Siren?, 18 Miss. C. L. Rev.

247 (1997).
136 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
1 For discussion of the relevance of this case to the stranded cost issue, see Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 808-12.
8Under United States case law, there is a presumption that general language in
statutes and regulations "is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights
but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise." National R.R. Passenger Corp. v, Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 470

U.S. 451, 466 (1985) (quoting Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937))..
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state can be read to contain an implicit public welfare condition,
including a commitment to widespread competition.

B. The Takings Claims
The takings argument might therefore seem the more plausible
argument in favor of legal recovery of stranded costs. But those

making the claim for deregulatory takings face several daunting
obstacles.
First, as discussed above, United States takings jurisprudence
has not found that regulatory actions in infrastructure industries
demand compensation. Procedural guarantees and political accountability are sufficient, although those pressing for deregulatory

takings also argue that this approach is in need of reform. Supporters of a legal entitlement to compensation would abandon the
deferential tradition of Hope, Market Street Railway, Permian Ba-

sin and Duquesne, instead treating deregulatory takings cases as
similar to land use takings. The land use cases are weak prece-

dents, however, because unlike individual property owners, utility
investors appear to be adequately protected in the political and
regulatory process. It is not clear that deregulation has challenged

this rationale. The Takings Clause should not be used to protect
those who have had a chance to influence policy or who are in a
position to anticipate future changes in policy and take them into
account in their investment decisions."

Second, as we argued above, there are seldom explicit contracts
guaranteeing regulated firms a certain rate of return on their assets

or promising to indemnify them against future changes in policy.""
Thus, firms should have internalized these risks in making their in11 A recent empirical study suggests that in another context, nuclear cost overruns,
regulator disallowance of costs did not have widespread adverse reputation effects on
firms' access to investment fuuds. See Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Mayo, Regulatory
Opportunism and Investment Behavior: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry (June 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com. Their findings suggest that
disallowance of stranded costs associated with power generation will not significantly
affect investors' willingness to back new transmission and distribution projects.
10See Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 814 (observing that very few regulated firms
have contracts with the state and that courts have interpreted the explicit language of
contracts that do exist literally but have not gone further); Rossi, supra note 82, at 309
(observing that only "unmistakably unambiguous" government promises create legally binding contracts and that most utility regulation in not in this form).
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vestment choices. Supreme Court opinions in ratemaking cases
generally require utility owners to accept the risks of unsuccessful
investments.

Third, it is not at all clear that utilities were induced to invest by
eager regulators, only to be surprised when regulators changed the
rules for rate recovery in mid-course. Instead, some commentators

argue that firms, as well as regulators, supported high levels of investment, fully aware of the risks of less than full recovery of the

costs."' Indeed, if firms anticipate that their costs will be reimbursed no matter what the competitive environment, they have an
incentive to overinvest. Assured compensation affects the incen-

tives for strategic behavior inherent in the relationship between the
regulated firm and the regulatory agency officials.' One result
may be to exaggerate the Averch-Johnson effect under which firms
select inefficiently high capital/labor ratios."'
To date, no court has accepted the sweeping deregulatory takings argument advocated by the industry. Where the breach of
contract claim has been raised, courts have uniformly required

clear and explicit contracts as a basis for protection of the utility's
interest in stranded cost recovery.

4

Outside of cases involving

&

"' See Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 825; Rossi, supra note 82, at 316. One author
argues that utilities have been aware of the risks of disallowance of recovery for certain types of investments since the 1950s. See Martin B. Zimmerman, Regulatory
Treatment of Abandoned Property: Incentive Effects and Policy Issues, 3 J.L.
Econ. 127, 129-31 (1988) (arguing that regulatory treatment of cancelled nuclear
plants in the 1980s was similar to that afforded manufactured natural gas plants in the

1950s).
112See Oliver E. Williamson, Deregulatory Takings and the Breach of the Regulatory Contract: Some Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1007, 1012-14 (1996); see also
Zimmerman, supra note 111, at 144 (concluding that firms subject to rate regulation
"in most circumstances, will seek to continue projects regardless of the social efficiency").
"3 See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am. Econ. Rev. 1052 (1962); Robert J. Michaels, Stranded
Investments, Stranded Intellectuals, 19 Reg. 47 (1996); Williamson, supra note 112, at
1012-14.
114In Energy Association v. Public Service Commission, 653 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct.
1996), the court rejected a utility's argument that the "failure to guarantee full recovery of stranded costs constitutes breach of contract." Id. at 513. Instead, the court
held "'just and reasonable' rates do not necessarily ... immunize utilities from the effects of competition." Id. at 514. Thus, only those utilities expressly contracting for
monopolies will probably be able to have such monopolies recognized and enforced.
See also Hovenkamp, supra note 82, at 811 & n.42 (citing In re Binghamton Bridge,
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physical invasion for access to network wires," the takings claims
have been rejected by the courts. 1 6 Even though the courts have re70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51, 82 (1865) ("enforcing an explicit monopoly provision in a corporate charter")). In another case, the Public Service Company of New Hampshire
("PSNH") had been promised by the State of New Hampshire recovery of a specific
investment of $2.3 billion in a bankruptcy proceeding. PSNH successfully obtained an
injunction against a New Hampshire restructuring plan that did not guarantee recovery of the costs of this investment. In reviewing the district court injunction, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that there was a likelihood of success on the merits, given the specific agreements between the utility and state and
federal regulators. The court also noted that the possibility of irreparable harm from
bankruptcy made issuance of a preliminary injunction appropriate. See Public Service
Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 167 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1998). However, the First Circuit held that
the district court was incorrect in its decision to issue an injunction against implementation of New Hampshire's plan for all New Hampshire utilities:
The district court's extension of the injunction to protect all other New
Hampshire electric utilities is more troublesome. Although the other utilities
have joined in attacks on the Final Plan similar to those made by PSNH, it is
not clear that they can assert the Contracts Clause or bankruptcy
reorganization arguments that made PSNH's case so appealing to the district
court. Nor is it eyident that utilities are constitutionally insulated against losses
that result merely from a change in rate regulation that introduces competition.
Id. at 28; see also Public Service Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 167 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.1998), cert.
denied 525 U.S.1066 (1999) (rejecting a federal preemption claim based on the "filed
rate doctrine," arguing that tariffs filed with FERC preclude New Hampshire from
denying stranded cost recovery, and rejecting injunction claims by utilities that lack a
clear contract guaranteeing recovery from previous bankruptcy reorganization).
1Notions
of physical invasion hold a grip on the definition of what constitutes a
taking in the American legal mind. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Supreme Court found that the use of a few square
inches of property on the outside of a building for a cable television cable connection
constituted a taking. The smallest physical invasion, according to Loretto, can constitute a taking. Thus, mandated open access of network facilities, such as power
transmission lines, without compensation may be held to be a taking. When a physical
occupation is present, some courts have required compensation for a taking in the deregulation context, although the basis for the taking is a per se physical invasion, not
interference with investment-backed expectations. See Gulf Power Co. v. United
States, 998 F. Supp. 1386, 1394-95 (N.D. Fla. 1998) (relying upon Sidak & Spulber to
support the proposition that a permanent physical occupation of property constitutes
a per se taking); GTE Southwest v. Public Util. Comm'n of Texas, 10 S.W.3d 7,10-14
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (finding a taking based on Loretto where the Commission ordered GTE to revise its tariff to ensure reasonable, nondiscriminatory bases for
decisions affecting access to customers by alternate service providers, including "the
relocation of multiple demarcation points to a single point of demarcation on
multi-unit premises").
116 See, e.g., In re Energy Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 653 N.Y.S.2d 502,515 (Sup.
Ct. 1996) (rejecting a deregulatory takings argument against stranded cost recovery,
stating, "The rule of Smyth v. Ames ... does not prevail today."); In re Retail Wheeling Tariffs, 575 N.W.2d 808 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that retail competition

1468

[V61. 86:1435

Virginia Law Review

fused to accept deregulatory takings claims, deregulatory takings
lawsuits have resulted in settlements-sometimes imposing transi-

tion surcharges that will cost consumers billions"'-and have
influenced the adoption of consumer surcharges and access charges
at the state and federal levels."' The very success of public utilities
in having their .interests heard at the state level is an argument
against applying the Takings Clause to require compensation. Although the firms will not always win all the compensation they
want, utilities are clearly an important force in state politics that
are well able to raise their concerns within existing institutions and
procedures.

"

III. POLITICAL RISK AND DIRECT FOREIGN INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT IN EMERGING ECONOMIES1

We turn now to a very different kind of investment environment,
but one that raises some of the same problems as the deregulation
of electric power and telecommunications in the United States. Investing in infrastructure anywhere in the world is risky because of
the high fixed costs required in most projects. In general, capital
cannot simply be shipped out if the investment climate turns sour.
Although risk-taking is an inevitable part of any major project, porequiring utilities to provide third-party access does not constitute an unconstitutional
taking); see also In re Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co.'s Rate Unbundling, 748 A.2d
1161 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (rejecting a customer's takings claim based on
the argument that stranded cost surcharges unconstitutionally impair the preexisting
contract with the utility). In those rare instances where there is a specific agreement
between utilities and regulators, utilities have had more success with the claim. See
supra note 114.
-See Steve Isser & Steven A. Mitnick, Enron's Battle With PECO, Pub. Util.
Fort., Mar. 1, 1998, at 38 (discussing Pennsylvania litigation over stranded costs,
which raised the deregulatory takings argument and resulted in a multi-billion dollar
settlement).
118 See Chen, supra note 61, at 1542-43 (discussing how the argument has played out
in the context of the Federal Communications Commission). Based in part on policy
arguments similar to Sidak and Spulber's, FERC has allowed for full recovery of
stranded costs in its wholesale electricity restructuring order, but only partial recovery
of stranded costs in restructuring the natural gas industry. See John Burritt
McArthur, The Irreconcilable Differences Between FERC's Natural Gas and Electricity Stranded Cost Treatments, 46 Buff. L. Rev. 71 (1998). Some states, such as
California and Rhode Island, have provided for full recovery of stranded costs in their
plans to restructure the retail electricity industry. See also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
119 Jonathan Rodden provided research assistance on this portion of the Article.
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litical risks are often a function of variables under the control of
governments. Firms may invest only to find their investments
"stranded" because of subsequent changes in the legal and regulatory environment. Thus, the stranded cost issue-by bringing to
the fore the tension between compensation to the industry and
flexibility and innovation in regulatory policy-bears structural
and economic similarities to a much larger problem of the political
risk of investing in emerging markets.
It is one thing to locate an analogy between conditions in the
United States and abroad and quite another to recommend the importation of legal doctrines. Legal transplants are commonplace,
but they are always problematic since one cannot know for sure
how a legal form taken from one environment will function in another. Nevertheless, if a state wishes to attract international
business investment, the borrowing of legal forms has the benefit
of creating a legal environment familiar to investors from the developed world. Commercial codes have sometimes been imported
wholesale from developed countries into emerging economies for
this purpose.120 Bilateral investment treaties provide a set of background conditions for all contracts between firms from the treaty
states. Another option is to leave one's own laws intact and encourage investors to make their own arrangements under which the
law of a developed country applies and disputes are to be settled
through international arbitration. There are weaknesses inherent
in all of these possibilities, not the least of which is the creation of a
two-track system under which foreign investors are treated differently from domestic investors-better in some ways and worse in
others. Thus it makes sense to consider alternatives that lower the
risks created by public actions for all investors, domestic and foreign. In seeking to create a strong environment for foreign
investment, a country's goal should not be to maximize foreign investment but to attract productive, competitively priced projects.
This suggests that a balance needs to be struck between providing
security to investors and discouraging projects that generate monopoly gains.

,m See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, The Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazakhstani Reception of a Transplanted Foreign Investment Code, 18 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 1235

(1997).
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The reduction of political risk is an important issue since much
foreign direct investment over the last two decades has been in in-

frastructure industries. For example, private electric power
projects are of growing importance with 140 plants under construction, 211 in operation, and 486 under development as of 1998."'
The total value of investment in private infrastructure projects in
developing countries in 1997 exceeded $100 billion.' Infrastructure deals cover the range of possible government/private sector
relationships, including simple construction contracts; build, operate, and transfer ("BOT") projects;' purchases of public firms; and
build, operate, and own investments operating under state regulatory authority. Behind many of these deals are power purchase
agreements which are long-term agreements with the buyers of a
project's service-such as a commercial purchaser of electricity-

that provide funds for payment of project expenses, repayment of
the project's debts, and dividends or distributions to those who
hold equity in the project.
Historically, many infrastructure firms were state-owned enterprises. The move to privatize these firms and to permit private
investment is occurring simultaneously with the creation of national regulatory frameworks. This trend contrasts with the situation
in the United States, where private firms have always been an important factor even in monopolistic infrastructure industries. Public

firms are often saddled with inefficient capital stock, and the costs
of disposing of these assets are borne by the state (or the taxpayer)
as part of the "restructuring" process that precedes the sale of the
assets. Restructuring is often just a polite way of saying that the

state will take over and liquidate loss-making portions of the firm
in order to increase the value of the assets to be privatized.

See The Balance of Power, Economist, June 6,1998, at 59.
See Theodore H. Moran, Political and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Development in Developing Countries: Introduction and Overview 7 (Aug. 1999) (paper
presented at Private Infrastructure for Development, supra note 6).
23 Under a BOT arrangement, the contractor builds the plant and then sells the
power that is produced for a period of time. Once one is committed to a risky environment, more control over the environment may be preferred to less. In some cases
the firm may only consider the extremes of equipment sales or a BOT project. An intermediate case where the firm accepts much of the risk and has little control over its
magnitude may be the worst possible strategy. Thus the structure of the deals reflects
guesses about the stability of the political regime and the legal system.
121
'2
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In the ideal case, the assets are sold to investors who have good
information about the structure of the regulatory environment in

the post-privatization world. The reality is not so simple. Regulatory structures are seldom transparent, stable, and credible, and

investors complain loudly about ex post changes in the rules."
However, anyone with experience in the countries involved ought
to predict instability in the political/regulatory environment. The

business environment is risky in most emerging markets, and an
investor would be foolish to ignore that fact when bidding on a pri-

vatizing firm or organizing an investment project. Finance
markets already incorporate risk premia that reflect regulatory un-

certainty in the United States," and the same is true in emerging
and developing economies where a number of private advisory services provide information on economic and political risk."
However, because uncertainty about the legal and policy environment in developing countries may lead to extremely high risk

premia," countries that wish to reduce these costs would benefit
from increasing the credibility of their commitments.

A basic risk that investors fear is outright expropriation. Bilateral investment treaties and international guarantee agencies
outlaw expropriation and impose sanctions." In practice, the like14 See Sanford V. Berg, Priorities in Market Reform: Regulatory Structures and
Performance, 7 Pac. & Asian J. Energy 89,89 (1998), available in Lexis.
'u See A. Lawrence Kolbe & William B. Tye, The Duquesne Opinion: How Much
"Hope" Is There for Investors in Regulated Firms?, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 113, 115 (1991).
2For
example, risks are quantified in The International Country Risk Guide
("ICRG"), created in 1980 by the editors of Interuational Reports. See Robin L. Diamonte et al., Political Risk in Emerging and Developed Markets, Fin. Analysts J.,
May/June 1996, at 71, 75 ("Banks, multinational corporations, importers, and exporters, among others, use the ICRG model to determine the risks of operating in,
investing in, or lending to particular countries.").
127 Claire Hill notes that political risk differs from the other risks investors face in
that it attaches to heterogeneous events and involves higher levels of uncertainty. See
Claire A. Hill, How Investors React to Political Risk, 8 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 283,

288 (1998).
12 For discussion of such protections, see Giorgio Sacerdoti, The Sources and Evolution of International Legal Protection for Infrastructure Investment Confronting
Political and Regulatory Risks (Aug. 1999) (paper presented at Private Infrastructure
for Development, supra note 6); Thomas W. Waelde, International Treaties and
Regulatory Risk: The Effectiveness of International Law Disciplines, Rules and Treaties in Reducing the Political and Regulatory Risk for Private Infrastructure
Investment in Developing Countries (Aug. 1999) (paper presented at Private Infrastructure for Development, supra note 6).
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lihood of expropriation has fallen dramatically in recent years, al-

though the trend could be reversed.12 ' Political and regulatory risks
short of outright expropriation, however, are among the most
costly to the foreign investor and are not covered by contractual
provisions outlawing expropriation. The problem for government
policymakers is to decide when to indemnify firms against such
risks and when to treat the risks as part of the ex ante calculations
of investors. These risks fall into several categories.

One risk is the introduction of local competitors into a market
that the investor thought had been awarded as a monopoly franchise. Particularly in network industries, modification of franchise
terms may have major implications for investors and the firm.Y0

Sometimes countries have made very generous deals with incumbent firms in the process of opening their markets. For example, in
early 1998 the Hong Kong Government reached an agreement with
Hong Kong Telecom to terminate its exclusive license more than

eight years ahead of its scheduled expiration date. In return for this
deal with regulators, Hong Kong Telecom received US$866 million
(HK$6.7 billion) and the right to increase local charges. Although
the buyout of Hong Kong Telecom's franchise may seem extrava-

129 Outright expropriation is of diminishing importance in international business
dealings. Defining an act of expropriation as a government takeover of all the firms in
the same industry in the same country in the same year, expropriations reached a
modern high in 1974 and 1975 and fell to single digits in 1980. Between 1987 and 1992,
none took place. See Michael S. Minor, The Demise of Expropriation as an Instru-

ment of LDC Policy, 1990-1992, J. Int'l Bus. Stud., First Quarter 1994, at 177,178-80;
Michael Minor, LDCs, TNCs and Expropriation in the 1980s, 25 The CTC Reporter
53, 53-55 (1988). Philip R. Stansbury, writing at a time when expropriation risk
seemed close to zero, explains how to structure deals to minimize the risks and costs
of expropriation. See Philip R. Stansbury, Planning Against Expropriation, 24 Int'l
Law. 677, 677-88 (1990). His discussions suggest that expropriation is uncommon, not
only because of changing perceptions of the value of state takeovers, but also because
multinationals have learned how to organize their businesses to limit the assets at
risk. Stansbury's proposals seem to reflect common practice in international business
deals even in countries where the risk of outright expropriation is small. For example,
he recommends minimizing the assets under the corporate umbrella that could be an
expropriation target. See id. at 678-83.
'30 In network infrastructure industries, two issues that raise uncertainty are unbundling, or conditions on vertical integration, and third-party access to network
facilities. See Pierre Guislain, The Privatization Challenge: A Strategic, Legal, and
Institutional Analysis of International Experience 262 (1997).
3
1 I See HK Telecoms Industry Enters New Era of Competition, Asia Pulse, Apr. 1,
1998, at 1, available in Lexis.
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gant," it bears some similarity to the way regulators often compensate the stranded costs of utilities in the United States. The main
difference seems to be that in the Hong Kong case an explicit contract did exist, and the new regime was eager to maintain
continuity with the previous government by honoring its contracts.
Elsewhere, governments have not been so generous.133 In deciding on a policy, a country needs to consider the calculations of
prospective investors. Guarantees can work to attract investment,
but if they are too strong, moral hazard could lead to overinvestment. A government that gives overly generous guarantees to
monopolists may find itself swamped with investments that earn
monopoly rents and do little to improve the country's development

prospects.
A second risk is the opportunistic behavior of joint venture
partners, especially when the partner is a state-owned firm or one
with close political connections to the regime in power. A study by
the International Finance Corporation concludes that joint ven-

tures are likely to be fragile if they depend only on the local firm's
"intimate knowledge of government affairs or familiarity with local

financial markets."" As the authors of the study point out, this "intimate knowledge" may imply corruption or conflicts of interest
between the partners.135 According to some research, few multina-

1

Following this deal, Kong Telecom's profit rose by 52%. See HK$ 6.7b Compensation Lifts HK Telecom Profit by 52%, Bus. Times (Singapore), May 5, 1998, at 16,
available in Lexis.
133 The monopoly franchise of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
was dismantled by President Fidel Ramos, and the firm now faces rigorous new
competition. See Hadi Salehi Esfahani, The Political Economy of the Telecommunications Sector in the Philippines, in Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment 145,
196-97 (Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller eds., 1996); Belltel Licence Spells 'Havoc' But
May End PLDT Monopoly, Asia Pac. Telecoms Analyst, Nov. 17, 1997, at 9. Singapore has indicated that it will end Singapore Telecom's monopoly on local and
international services in 2000, seven years earlier than planned. See Mark L. Clifford,
Asia's Furious Phone Derby, Bus. Wk., Feb. 24, 1997, at 122. Although Singapore
Telecom received some compensation for its franchise, the deal with Singapore Telecom was for substantially less than the Hong Kong deal. See Early End to HK
Telecom's Monopoly Gives HK the Edge, Bus. Times (Singapore), Feb. 5, 1998, at 1,
available in Lexis.
134 Robert R. Miller et al., International Joint Ventures in Developing Countries:
Happy Marriages? 23 (International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper No. 29,

1996).

13s See id. at 19.
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tionals prefer local partners because of the potential for conflicts
over objectives. But many must accept them as part of the bargaining process that leads to investment.136
Third, a new regime may seek to void or renegotiate a contract

on the grounds that it provides an unconscionable level of profits
to the private firms and/or was the result of corrupt payoffs or inappropriate influence by those close to the previous rulers. Deals
meant to isolate a multinational from risk may not be politically
sustainable if the profits turn out to be too high. Recent examples

involve projects in Pakistan, India, and Indonesia.
Pakistan attracted foreign power plant contractors by promising
to buy their power at a fixed price per kilowatt hour during the
1993-96 government of former premier Benazir Bhutto. This
seemed at the time a clever way to isolate foreign firms from the
vagaries of local electricity demand and the politically freighted nature of electric rates. As it turned out, the price appears to provide

generous profits to investors and threatens to impose a large cost
on the Pakistani treasury, since the country will not be able to sell
the power to consumers for the contract price.
Officials allege corruption in the original contracts signed with
the Bhutto government and are seeking to renegotiate the contracts to cut the tariffs. Pakistan is using its own courts to pursue
this matter, and the Supreme Court of Pakistan has barred the investors from referring one dispute to international arbitration."

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are pushing
for a settlement."" Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister deposed in
1999, also had been urging a settlement to create a better foreign
investment climate.139 Under the new administration, headed by
-See Stephen J. Kobrin, Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing

Sector in Developing Countries, 41 Int'l Org. 609, 623-24 (1987). In Papua New
Guinea, for example, the government normally exercises its option to participatein
mining and petroleum projects. Sometimes the government has purchased increased
shares of projects under the implicit threat of expropriation. See Papua New Guinea
Investment Climate Statement for 1997, Int'l Market Insight Rep., July 15, 1997, ¶ 27,
available in Lexis.
"See Pakistan Court Bars International Arbitration in Power Tariff Row, Agence
France Presse, November 3, 1999, available in Lexis.
' See World Bank Energy Mission in Pakistan for Talks, Agence France Presse,

Nov. 1, 1999, available in Lexis.

See Fate of Hubco Rests with the IMF: Talks Start Today Over the Impending
Debt Crisis in Pakistan, Which Could Prevent the Electricity Generator from Paying
139
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General Pervez Musharraf, allegations of corruption remain in the
air.1 Nevertheless, the World Bank has succeeded in resolving
some of the disputes, although allegations of corruption against investors in several large independent power projects remain points
of contention." One investor in a major project, for example, insists that it will not negotiate over reductions in power tariffs
unless corruption charges are dropped.142

Similar problems arose in India concerning the Dabhol electric
power project in the state of Maharashtra where Enron was the
lead contractor. The contract was negotiated with one state government, and when a new political party took control, it canceled
the project, arguing that corruption had produced a deal that was
too favorable to the foreign investors. No corruption was proved,
but the deal was eventually renegotiated in a way that permitted
each side to claim victory.1 4 3
Its Foreign Creditors, Fin. Times, July 13, 1998, Companies & Finance Section, at 23;
Pakistan Pledges to Seek Power Companies Deal, Fin. Times, August 4, 1999, AsiaPacific Section, at 4; Sharif Orders Speedy End to Power Dispute, Fin. Times, August
14-15,1999, Asia-Pacific Section, at 5.
14 See Christine Hill, Power Failure, Institutional Investor, Nov. 1999, at 109.
141 See Pakistan's IPP Disputes Resolved Except Hubco, Kapco, Asia Pulse, Nov.
22, 1999, available in Lexis; Row With IPPs Holding Up ADB Lending for Pakistan,
Asia Pulse, May 3, 2000, available in Lexis; Hubco to Seek Compensation from Pakistan, Agence France Presse, June 21, 2000, available in Lexis.
142See Hubco Links Power Tariffs Talks to Withdrawal of Charges by Pakistan,
Agence France Presse, Dec.11, 1999, available in Lexis.
13 A critical report from the federal government's Comptroller and Auditor General, however, casts doubt on the State of Maharashtra's claims. See Frank Gray,
Enron Slammed by Aud-Gen Report, Power in Asia, May 4, 1998, available in Lexis;
Comptroller and Auditor General of India Debunks Maharashtra Govt.'s Claim on
Enron, The Hindu, Apr. 26,1998, available in Lexis. One structural problem that may
have influenced the terms of the original deal concerns the pricing practices of the
State Electricity Boards ("SEB"). The SEBs routinely subsidize farmers and domestic
power users, and as a result, most are insolvent. To bring in foreign investors the federal government provided counter-guarantees to power producers who participated in
state projects. In the Dabhol case, after the contract was canceled, the federal government made it clear that it would deduct any payments made under the guarantee
from funds transferred to the state the following year. Perhaps as a result of this experience, the federal government at first was unwilling to provide counter-guarantees
for future deals. In August 1998, however, the federal government issued counterguarantees for three stalled projects, but the terms are less generous than those given
to Enron in 1994. The goal is to permit the projects to go forward while still giving the
SEBs an incentive to reform their tariff structures. See Shekhar Hattangadi, State
Willing to Renegotiate with Euron, Platt's Oilgram News, Aug. 24, 1995, at 2, available in Lexis; Uphill Task for Reformers, Fin. Times, January 21, 1998, Survey-India
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With the fall of former President Suharto, the new Indonesian
government is seeking to void or renegotiate a number of infrastructure contracts that gave Suharto's children and close
associates ownership stakes in joint ventures with foreign companies. The contracts were awarded without open competitive
bidding, and the current government argues that the terms of the
contracts are overly generous to investors given the costs of comparable projects in nearby countries. Not surprisingly, the
companies are complaining about breach of contract. The United
States government, which supported the overthrow of Suharto and
has criticized the corruption of his regime, is backing its own inves-

tors, perhaps because it had insured some of the deals.1" Although
one interim settlement has been reached,"' other disputes between
Indonesia and investors remain unresolved.14 6
The cases of Pakistan, India, and Indonesia represent complex
mixtures of opportunism and outrage. Corruption may have occurred but has obviously proved difficult to document. Even if no
bribes were paid, the fact that the contracts look like giveaways of
state funds to outsiders makes them vulnerable to renegotiation.
Our discussion of takings law as a way to create credible commitments should be read in light of a basic assumption of state
legitimacy. If the state writes contracts that its citizens do not ac-

cept as fair, no formal legal requirement is likely to provide
sufficient protection for foreign investors.

Other regulatory risks may be less blatant, but no less costly to
investors. Regulators may modify the terms of cost-of-service regulation for privately-owned natural monopolies. They may make a
transition from cost-of-service regulation to alternatives, such as
price caps, benchmark regulation, or negotiated franchise agreements. As with the termination or modification of franchises, many
of these regulatory changes can result in heavy costs for infrastructure projects and may influence the behaviors of investors and the
firm. In Jamaica, following the transition from a franchise-based
Power Section, at 1: Guarantees Ignite Flurry of Indian Power Plant Activity, Fin.
Times, August 26,1998, World Trade Section, at 4.
14See Jay Solomon, Sweetheart Contracts: U.S. Is Pressing Indonesia to Honor Suharto-Era Deals, Asian Wall St. J. July 22,1999, at 1.
14 See Interim Deal in Indonesian Power Dispute, Fin. Times, March 10, 2000, at 10.
1 See Indonesia Power Plant Project Could Cost Germany Millions, Deutsch
Presse-Agentur, May 27, 2000, available in Lexis.
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structure to commission regulation in 1962, Jamaica Telephone
Company stopped all investment in infrastructure expansion. The
Jamaican network was not expanded until the 1980s.1 47 In some
contexts, investment risks also can be influenced by decisions of
regulators in non-host countries that share revenues to pay for infrastructure in telecommunications"* or that provide fuel for the
energy sector.

Obviously, the complex of problems outlined here cannot be
remedied with a single instrument. Furthermore, constitutional
guarantees mean little in some emerging economies where new
constitutions have appeared at frequent intervals and amendments
are commonplace. Nevertheless, constitutional law usually has
some special status, and, at least in countries where this is so, constitutional property protections may make sense. The risk,

however, is that countries will adopt a rigid solution that is interpreted by the courts in ways that severely limit democratic

accountability. Reformers need to keep the dual goals of investment security and policy flexibility in balance. In the next Part of
this Article we provide some general guidance that is derived from

the United States experience. As should be clear from the first Part
of the Article, however, we by no means recommend the wholesale

adoption of United States law. Instead, each country will need to
consider the factors we discuss and make its own decisions.
IV. DEVELOPING A PRINCIPLED TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

A constitutional takings clause provides protection for private
property rights by requiring government compensation under'certain conditions, and thus limits the government's ability to impose

costs on property owners. A takings provision is "an attempt to
find some fair balance between the forces of change and the secu-

See Esfahani, supra note 133, at 23.
example, the United States Federal Communications Commission has moved
toward making foreign telecoms pay more in the long distance charges they share
with United States telecom operators. Some foreign telecoms, such as Phillipine Long
Distance Telephone, Hong Kong Telecom, and Indosat of Indonesia derive 19% to
46% of their profits from these payments. See Clifford, supra note 133, at 122. Developing countries receive more long distance calls than they make, adding to the impact
their telecom sector will suffer as such charges are modified. See Crossed Wires in
Global Telecoms, UNESCO Courier, Nov. 1,1998, at 1, available in Lexis.
147
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rity of established interests."'14 9 For us, the basic tension in articulating a consistent doctrine is between the government as purchaser
and the government as policymaker. Government can affect private property owners both when it seeks to obtain resources for a
public project using the power of eminent domain and when it exercises policymaking authority. A key issue for takings
jurisprudence is where to draw the line between these two types of
state action. We argue that in the former case, compensation

should be required under a constitutional takings clause. In the latter case, it should not be required, although it may be justified in
particular instances."" Central to our argument is the recognition

that the government has sources of power independent of the market. If reformers propose a constitutional takings clause, then they
must ask how strong a role it ought to play in limiting government
policy. We believe that our proposed framework is consistent with

the United States Constitution and also argue that it is appropriate
for countries considering constitutional and regulatory reform.
The basic problem is to distinguish between situations where the
state should operate under the same constraints as private market
actors and other situations where it ought to be excused from these
constraints. This is a question that each state needs to answer on its
own. It cannot be derived from takings law doctrine standing alone

but is at the heart of a nation's view of the relationship between
public power and private rights. Just as a takings clause cannot

solve the problems raised by an unaccountable and illegitimate
state, so too it cannot determine which property entitlements are
democratically legitimate and which violate underlying concepts of

ownership. These issues must be faced head-on both by policymakers in emerging economies seeking to establish a rule of law and by

federal judges in the United States seeking a way through the
thicket of American jurisprudence. The most appropriate takings
rule is a function of other features of the political/economic environment. In developing countries, attempts to create strong
constitutional protections for private property must go along with
Sax, supra note 22, at 48.
Joseph Sax articulates a related but somewhat different view. He distinguishes
between the government as market participant and the government as mediator of
competing economic claims. For him, compensation would be required only in the
former case where the public action benefits a government enterprise. See id. at 62-64.
149
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reforms in the operation of the state. A state that has a strong underlying commitment to the market economy need not be overly
worried about establishing sweeping constitutional protections
against government actions-witness the United States' weak and
unclear constitutional restraints on regulatory incursions.
Even if one accepts our basic distinction between the government as purchaser and the government as policymaker, this does
not resolve all questions of when a taking should be found and how
much compensation should be paid. There still remain issues that
turn on the insurance function of takings law and on its impact on
the fairness and political legitimacy of alternative rules. We discuss
these issues at the end of this Part.

A. Government as Buyer
If the government is a purchaser, this implies that, when possible, the state ought to act like any other market participant. It
should pay its employees the market wage and purchase inputs at
market prices. Private actors can then ignore the fact that the gov-

ernment might in the future be a purchaser, since it acts just like
anyone else.151
Under an extreme version of this view, the government could
not obtain property for public use unless the seller agreed. When
the government purchases a good or service in a competitive private market, the seller's consent is a condition of the purchase.
When the state is trying to assemble a parcel of land for a public

project, however, requiring consent would give individual property
holders the power to extract excess rents. To overcome this problem, most governments have the power of eminent domain. That is,
they can take property to fulfill public purposes. The uniqueness of
land parcels means that this kind of taking will frequently involve
real estate.

151 Cf. Michelman supra note 15 at 1230-32 (noting the government obligation to
pay market value); see also Ackerman, supra note 18, at 52-53 (arguing that compensation is required to limit corruption and the partisan imposition of costs); Sax, supra
note 22, at 64-65,75-76 (arguing that compensation should be paid to limit unfairness
and prevent individualized cost-bearing in the public interest); Saul Levmore, Just
Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285, 308 (1988) (arguing that market mechanisms may provide a sufficient check on the political process in this
context).
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When eminent domain is used, payment of compensation at
market rates gives property owners the incentive to invest based on
estimates about future market conditions without also having to
guess the likelihood that the state will seize their assets. In other
words, compensation is justified for the same reason that government is required to pay for any inputs it uses. The goal is to make
private investors indifferent between whether the government or a
private buyer obtains their assets. The government's demand for
resources should not interfere with market tests on the margin. In
short, the ex ante probability that the government will coercively
take any particular piece of property is small in this first class of
cases, making it appropriate for the government to imitate private
market purchasers as much as possible. Compensation is required
independent of any special features of the owner or the property
itself. In principle, since the government is forcing a "sale" by its
condemnation procedures, the owner should be compensated for
any idiosyncratic value attached to the property. This is an impractical demand, however, because it would give the owner an
incentive to inflate his valuation to obtain excess compensation.
Even here, we would add one caveat. If a state has an antimonopoly law along the lines of American antitrust statutes, the
government should be authorized to appropriate profits that result
from monopoly power.152 The practical problem is distinguishing
between monopoly rents and the return to risk-taking. Investors in
emerging or unstable markets often incur extraordinary risks. If
they are unable to shift these risks to others, they should be able to
earn supra-normal profits if their investments turn out to be successful. There is, however, a circularity here. Political risk may be
one reason that profit rates on successful projects are so high in the

1See
Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery, supra note 24, at 1710; RoseAckerman, Regulatory Takings, supra note 24, at 37. A willingness to refuse to pay
compensation for monopoly rents is consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's refusal to find a taking in some recent cases. The opinions are Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987); Justice
Brennan's dissent in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 854
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S 1, 10-15
(1987). See also Levmore, supra note 151, at 313 & cases cited n.61. This principle is
implicit in interpretations of the United States antitrust laws that give consumers a
property right in competitively priced goods and services. See Reiter v. Sonotone

Corp., 442 U.S. 330,342 (1979).
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first place. If so, a compensation policy that credibly reduces political risk should not be applied retroactively to reimburse firms for
lost excess profits. Conversely, if the state has a good record of
compensating investors for losses incurred by state actions, then
the rate of return should reflect that fact, and compensation should
be based on a judgment of whether monopoly profits are being
earned and on whether the government was acting as a buyer or a
policymaker.

B. Government as Policymaker
Government policy may change as new political groupings come
to power and new information influences the policy debate. To
what extent should a takings clause protect private property owners from the vagaries of government actions? We argue that this
should not be an independent goal of takings law once the basic
distinction between the government as buyer and the government

as power-wielder has been clarified.153 The government pays for inputs at market prices but does not guarantee investors that its own

priorities will not shift over time. For example, if the government
changes regulatory priorities, no compensation should be due. To
the extent that the state needs to hire more lawyers and economists
to staff its agencies, it ought to pay them market rates, not dragoon
them into government service. However, if a new regulatory re-

gime affects the overall profitability of an industry and changes the
relative positions of firms in the industry, this should be viewed as

an exercise of government power that private firms have an obligation to take into account in their own planning for the future. A

regulation that is cheaper for one firm to comply with than another
should not give rise to a compensation claim by the disadvantaged
firm.'

1 In the United States a historical analysis reveals that the takings clause was not to
be "a bulwark for the maintenance of the established distribution of wealth." Sax, supra note 22, at 53.
The case would be different if the government had signed an explicit contract
with the private firm not to compete with it and then entered the market. In that case
the firm might demand damages under breach-of-contract principles. The issue for
the courts would be to decide whether to require the payment of damages or to declare the contract itself void on the ground of public policy. The issue would be one of
contracts law, not takings jurisprudence.
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In addition, following the lead of American doctrine, compensation should not be paid if the government action is analogous to a
private action that is one of the ordinary risks of economic life. The
distributive consequences produced by market pressures are a cost
of maintaining the incentives needed to make markets work effi-

ciently. For example, if the government competes with a private
business by selling surplus equipment or producing electricity, this
should not produce a takings claim because competitive losses do
not give rise to damage claims in the private sector."
Under this view, takings law should aim to provide optimal in-

centives to private investors, not deter opportunistic or predatory
state actors. In other words, its goal is to protect private property
conditional on the power of the state. It takes as given the imperfections in the government sphere and helps encourage efficient
private investment. Suppose, for example, that a regime is predatory in the sense that rulers use their power to enact policies that
provide private benefits to themselves, their families, and their
close associates. If a state has this character, takings law should not
insulate investors from this influence. If it does, the costs of state

overreaching will simply be shifted to other groups in the population, and an inefficient level of private investment will occur. Of

course, it is not only predatory states that impose costs. Democratic governments, in permitting policies to be adopted by majority
votes in representative assemblies, do not contemplate that all
statutes will meet with unanimous approval. The status quo has no
special legitimacy except to the extent that the constitution estab-

lishes rights that cannot be violated by ordinary legislation. This
fundamental feature of democratic government should not be un-

dermined by a takings doctrine that forbids majoritarian policies.
This framework leads us to the following conclusion. If the government needs to tear down your house in order to fulfill some
broader public goal, it must compensate you at market rates. How-

According to Sax, the essence of property
is not fixity at all, but fluidity. Property is the end result of a process of
competition among inconsistent and contending economic values. Instead of
some static and definable quantity, property really is a multitude of existing
interests which are constantly interrelating with each other .... Property is thus
the result of the process of competition.
Sax, supra note 22, at 61 (footnote omitted).
'
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ever, if the government determines that a dangerous microbe can
be rooted out only by burning down everyone's house, then no
compensation is required, since this is a policy applied across the
board. In other words, the takings law that we favor is not designed
to solve the deep problems that arise from a dysfunctional and
predatory state. Neither is it meant to undermine the possibility for
democratic decisions that impose costs as well as benefits. Instead,
if obviously inefficient state actions are a feature of the investment
climate, these government policies should be taken into account by

private investors. If investors were fully compensated for such
losses, they would overinvest in durable capital. Takings jurispru-

dence should not make investors indifferent to the government's
capital-destroying actions. A no-compensation rule for broad policy initiatives would encourage investors to lobby the state to
refrain from its wasteful policies.
Compensation need not, in practice, equal zero, but the state

should only pay compensation for investments that would have
been efficient in the absence of compensation. Investors must receive a lump sum payment, not a share of the existing capital
investment. Of course, we are not recommending that states be
permitted to act with impunity. We are only claiming that if they

do so, private firms ought to take this behavior into account in
planing their investment strategies. Otherwise, the costs of the ill-

advised state policies will be compounded by inefficient private investment decisions. If a firm expects to be fully compensated for a

public policy that destroys its property, it will invest too much in
the property."
Even in the policymaking category there are times when the

government should pay compensation if it wishes to encourage efficient private investment. Sometimes the government

takes

private property and does not destroy it but instead converts it to

&

-MFor a fuller discussion of the issue of overinvestment, see Lawrence Blume
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L.
Rev. 569, 618-620 (1984); Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation be Paid?, 77 Q. J. Econ. 71, 71-92 (1984). As Blume and Rubinfeld
argue, "Whatever the exact determination of compensation, it is important that the
measure be one that cannot be directly affected by the behavior of the individual investors, since any compensation measure which can be affected by private behavior
will create the possibility of inefficiency due to moral hazard." Blume & Rubinfeld,
supra, at 618 n.144.
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its own use. In that case, full compensation should be paid, since

efficiency requires the private investor to take this possibility into
account. A firm should be compensated both when the state nationalizes the firm's factory and when the state passes a regulation
requiring the factory to produce a certain mix of products to be
sold at state-determined prices.

This analysis suggests the following resolution of the takings law
controversies surrounding the deregulation of public utilities. De-

regulation is clearly a policymaking activity. Thus there is a
presumption against compensation. However, the government
should pay for investments that it required under the old regulatory regime that were not expected to be profitable for the private
firm. The most straightforward examples are the legal obligations

taken on by American electrical utilities to purchase power from
solar or wind sources. In those cases firms made legal commitments
that were not always economically efficient, with the understanding that they would be reimbursed by the regulatory authorities."
If some of a firm's assets are useful to the industry as a whole-for
example, the subscriber lists maintained by telephone companiescompensation should be paid to provide an incentive for firms to
develop such assets.158 United States courts should also look at the
adequacy of compensation for sharing bottleneck facilities.' Com5 See Brennan & Boyd, supra note 12, at 49-50. Some nuclear facilities may be in
this category as well, although a recent paper by Lyon and Mayo, see supra note 109,
casts doubt on that claim.
'sIn the United States, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that new entrants pay for these benefits, although there is a good deal of controversy over the
contractual mechanism established by the Act and the resulting levels of payments.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). The
interconnection obligations are at 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (Supp. III 1997). Earlier Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") attempts to require local exchange carriers to
interconnect were struck down by the courts as beyond the jurisdiction of the FCC.
See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Telephone Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441,1444-47 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
The court in Bell Atlantic held that the FCC action raised takings issues. The 1996 Act
required interconnection and established a negotiation and arbitration procedure to
determine the payment due local telephone companies. See Duane McLaughlin,
Note, FCC Jurisdiction Over Local Telephone Under the 1996 Act: Fenced Off?, 97
Colum. L. Rev. 2210, 2224-28 (1997). The Supreme Court resolved jurisdictional disputes raised under the 1996 Act in favor of the FCC in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board,

525 U.S. 366 (1999).
' In AT&T, the Supreme Court remanded to the Federal Communications Commission a proceeding to determine the prices at which local exchange carriers can sell
network elements to their competitors.
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pensation requirements should be imposed if the state requires
"open access" to facilitate the deregulation of telecommunications
or electric utility industries elsewhere in the world.
In general, the compensation decision ought to depend on a twostep analysis. First, can the government action be analogized to a
government purchase of an input in the market? If so, compensation should be paid at "fair market value." If not-that is, if the
harm to private property owners is part of a policy initiative-then
compensation should depend only on the future use of the property. The aim in the latter case is to produce optimal investment

decisions by private owners given some probability of government
actions that will reduce (or enhance) property values. In both
cases, the economic status of the owner and the magnitude of the
loss should be irrelevant. We do not, of course, claim that the dis-

tinction between government as buyer and government as
policymaker will always be easy to make or that a predatory state

might not carry out its aims simply by buying up properties on an
individual basis. Rather, we suggest that our distinction is one way
to strike a balance between giving some assurance to private inves-

tors, on the one hand, and limiting the moral hazard produced by
an overly broad takings clause, on the other. We do not believe

that a strong property clause, taken by itself, can be an effective
method of reforming a state that is otherwise illegitimate and un-

accountable.
Furthermore, the framework seems consistent with the basic
principles of the American Constitution. United States law,
however, is not a complete model of the rule we advocate. Compensation is routinely paid in cases that fit the first model-that is,
government use of the power of eminent domain to take individual
land parcels. But the American courts have not clearly distinguished between government as purchaser and government as
policymaker. Furthermore, United States courts have not dealt
well with the moral hazard issue. Instead, they argue that if the

state destroys your "thing" for whatever reason, it usually will be
required to pay you for it.1 In contrast, if it merely uses your assets
without taking title-to them by, for example, requiring you to comply with historical preservation standards, the state generally will

11

See the critical analysis of this doctrine in Ackerman, supra note 18, at 130-36.
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not be required to compensate you." This gives owners of buildings that might in the future be declared landmarks an incentive to

tear them down quickly so that the issue will not arise.16 2
C. The InsuranceIssue
Under the proposed doctrine developed so far, the extent and
limits of compensation are designed to influence the investment

choices of private individuals and firms, but the doctrine is indifferent to the overall economic status of investors. As a general

matter, we support this view with the one exception developed
here. Given the uncertainty that is an inherent feature of government, the insurance branch of the efficiency analysis may be
important if private insurance markets do not fill the gap. Private
property owners might want to purchase insurance if they view

government as an essentially random and unpredictable enterprise,
at least in its impact on particular persons." If the ex ante prob-

ability of being harmed is distributed broadly and if no
compensation is paid, two different results are possible. On the one
hand, if investors are risk neutral, they all rationally cut back their
investments just enough to compensate for the risk of expropriation. On the other hand, if they are risk averse, the uncertainty
created by the threat of harm may lead them to invest less and to
hold their assets in a form that is unlikely to be affected by the

public program. For international investors this may mean that
they do not invest in the country at all.

1 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104. 122-38 (1978). But see
the New York State Court of Appeals decision in Seawall Assoc. v. City of New
York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989). The New York high court found that both a
physical and a regulatory taking had occurred when New York City attempted to aid
the homeless by requiring owners of single-room-occupancy facilities to keep them
fully rented. See id at 1062-69. Exemptions and buyout provisions in the law did not
overcome this finding. Although the court did not use our reasoning, the result is consistent with our framework because the city law was designed to make use of existing
buildings to further a public purpose.
16 Cf. William A. Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws 174 (1985) (giving an example).
16 Cf. William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman:
Comments on Economic Interpretation of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. Legal
Stud. 269 (1988) (analyzing situations in which government actions produce demoralization costs).

2000]

DisentanglingDeregulatoryTakings

1487

At one level, the insurance rationale is simply another justification for compensation when the government is a market
participant or "buyer." A free market combined with wellenforced property rights and a law criminalizing theft insures owners that no private individual can legally take their property
without their consent. They can insure against floods, hurricanes,
and theft, but they do not need to insure against the possibility that

someone will assert an interest in their property. Because the government can exercise its eminent domain power, however, it may
appear more like a hurricane than a market participant, and hence
people may demand insurance if compensation is not paid. Takings
law would not need to be concerned with this problem if private insurance were available, but the risks discussed here are not always
insurable because of the problems of moral hazard and adverse se-

lection."
Moral hazard occurs when the existence of insurance leads the

insured person to take actions that increase the probability or the
magnitude of the loss. In this context, it occurs if property owners
secretly lobby to have their property taken or at least do not actively oppose a policy that will produce that result. Although such
lobbying is possible when the government pays compensation, the
obvious budgetary consequences of such behavior will help to
check abuses. Adverse selection occurs if insurance companies

cannot adequately sort property owners into risk classes. If highrisk and low-risk owners are charged the same rate, low-risk own-

ers may decide to self insure. The remaining pool of insured
owners becomes riskier and premiums must rise. The remaining
low-risk owners may then opt out of the pool. If the insurance
companies have less information about risks than property owners,
profitable insurance contracts may be impossible to write.' For
both of these reasons, when the state acts as a purchaser of inputs,
it may sometimes be a more efficient provider of such insurance
through the payment of compensation than the private market.

1 But cf. Thomas Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1561, 1581 (1987) ("[I]t is not clear why adverse selection and moral hazard
are more serious problems in this area than in any other area where risks arise primarily from acts by human agents (rather than from natural disasters).").
6 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 156, at 584-99.
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However, we need to consider whether compensation should be
paid, not just when the government acts as a buyer, but also when
it acts as a policymaker. In considering the likelihood that property
owners would demand insurance, the degree of harm is a central
concern, but courts must decide what standard of comparison to

use.'" A generally accepted rule of thumb is that individuals behave in a risk-averse way when a major portion of their total
wealth is threatened. Because owner-occupied housing represents
a large proportion of most owners' personal wealth, the insurance
rationale implies that the government should compensate home-

owners when it takes their houses either as a buyer or a
policymaker. 67 The standard of comparison should be the individual's total wealth, not just the property "affected" by the taking.

In developing countries, one particularly perverse result of foreign investment in infrastructure

has sometimes

been state

expropriation of private property to help the investor amass a large
land parcel for development. A takings clause could require the
state to pay compensation when it condemns private houses for

such purposes. Takings law can then provide security to ordinary
people whose houses or small businesses stand in the way of largescale infrastructure development projects. Unfortunately, there can
be a conflict here. The insurance rationale would counsel in favor

of compensation for households who lose their homes to state action whether the state is a buyer or a policymaker. Yet if full
compensation is paid, homeowners will have an incentive to overinvest in their properties. Thus the compensation formula should
be calculated to provide some risk sharing with property owners
through deductible or co-payment options and through rules that
do not pay for idiosyncratic values.
The insurance rationale is much stronger for government takings

of family homes than for actions that harm broadly-held corporations.'" There are two reasons for this. First, large diversified
1"For example, should the courts define the plaintiff's property as the coal that
cannot be mined because of the regulatory statute, so that 100% of it has been taken,
or as the firm's entire mining operation, so that only a small share has been lost? See
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
167See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 156, at 582-99 (making this argument and
discussing several examples).
1 Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741 (1999)
(exploring distributive justice perspectives on takings law).

2000]

DisentanglingDeregulatoryTakings

1489

corporations ought to be risk neutral even toward relatively large
losses, because shareholders and other investors can insure by

holding a diversified portfolio of investments. Private firms can diversify their risks more effectively than even many wealthy

individual investors and may also be in the position to exert leverage based on international ratings of country risk."6 Second,
political risk insurance is available from both public and private

sources. Increasingly, private insurers are offering political risk insurance that supplements that offered by public agencies such as

the World Bank Group's Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency ("MIGA"). Insurance provided by multilateral agencies
deters governmental breach of commitments since host countries
risk losing certain valuable benefits if they breach."' Private firms
also monitor the behavior of states where they have exposure and
can discipline states through higher rates or denial of coverage.
Thus a country with a poor risk rating might want to establish a
strong takings doctrine as a warranty that it will not take advantage

of investors in fixed capital."1 This is the final issue to which we
now turn.
D. PrivateInvestment and Public Sector Opportunism

Often, constitutional property clauses are justified as a way to
deter a predatory state from interfering with the development of a

favorable climate for private investment. The property clause provides a warranty or guarantee that the state will indemnify
investors against certain state actions. We have already argued that

compensation should be paid when the state is a purchaser of inputs, and these payments may have an indirect impact on

government decisionmaking. A compensation requirement can
16 German constitutional law has reached a similar conclusion but for different reasons. See van der Walt, supra note 50, at 135-36 (discussing the issue and citing
relevant cases). Focusing on the role of property in furthering personal freedom, the
German Constitutional Court distinguishes between organizational landowners where
no issue of personal freedom arises and individual lessees where it does.
170 MIGA may suspend on-going credit or loan activity when it has a dispute with a
host country. MIGA offers political and regulatory risk insurance up to $200 million
per project and $620 million per country. See West, supra note 14, at 34.
171 Political risk insurance can facilitate leveraging since many lending institutions
that underwrite debt in project financing are also regular buyers of political risk insurance. See id.
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limit government opportunism by forcing public policymakers to
consider the opportunity costs of their proposed actions. Like any
other purchase of inputs, policies that "take" private property
would then have concrete budgetary impacts that are immediately
reflected in tax bills or borrowing capacity.
We do not believe, however, that an expansive takings doctrine

is a suitable tool to deter an overreaching state in the policymaking
context. If public choices are the result of the competition of vari-

ous groups for political benefits, powerful groups will not need a
constitutionally mandated takings doctrine to preserve their inter-

ests. Conversely, a compensation requirement is unlikely to be an
effective check on the power of those groups. They are still likely
to be able to obtain an overall legislative package that is beneficial

to them. Those who decide on government policies do not pay the
compensation themselves and suffer few negative consequences

from imposing costs on those with little political clout.
Thus, a state with a strong and credible takings doctrine but with
no other checks on its power can still operate with a good deal of

impunity. Consider, for example, a government without an independent judiciary, in which judges are beholden to the executive or
legislative branch. Such a state can manipulate the takings doctrine
to compensate cronies for property taken for unproductive public
projects. Ordinary people suffer both because the state engages in
projects that are wasteful on their own terms and because taxpay-

ers must pay the cost of compensation. Furthermore, investors who
should be taking into account the risks of government actions in
planning their own investments will not do so. The citizenry is left
paying for private capital investments that are not economically

justified given the likelihood that the property will be taken and
destroyed by the government. In short, a regime that seeks to
amass private benefits for its rulers and their associates should not
be encouraged to establish a strong constitutional compensation
requirement unless other reforms are carried out that increase the
overall accountability of the state to its citizens. A property clause

can be part of a general move to a more democratic system; it
should not be a stand-alone response to an uncertain investment
enviroument.
In this context, consider again the United States Supreme
Court's generally deferential approach to takings law claims in the
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area of public utility regulation. The general stance of United
States courts fits our distinction between state as purchaser and
state as policymaker, but with one additional twist. Given a democratic government whose claim to legitimacy rests on its
accountability to its citizens, policies are justified if they are the result of an accountable process-legislative, administrative, or
judicial. Such policies should not give rise to takings claims beyond
the requirement that the state pay for inputs. Effectively, a showing that the state has established fair processes is a defense against
a takings claim.. Thus the adequacy of regulatory procedures provides a justification for the United States courts' refusal to find that
takings have occurred in the context of public utility regulation.
Courts defer to government decisions on the ground that the legislature has established fair procedures for executive actions that
impose costs and benefits on individuals and firms. Rather than go
into the details of individual decisions, the court evaluates the
overall fairness of the process established by law and the workings
of the system in practice. As we argued above, public utilities are
active participants in political and administrative processes and so

can hardly be seen as innocent, uninformed outsiders." They are
part of the political bargaining that produces regulatory policies,
and if they do not obtain one hundred percent of their goals, that is
hardly a reason to pay compensation.
In any state with a basically democratic structure, standard principles of administrative law could be applied to decide whether
an independent takings claim should be considered in the regulatory context. A country's courts would have to decide what
procedures are necessary and sufficient to void a claim for compensation. One model for reformers in other democracies is the
United States Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for
notice, a hearing, and a reasoned opinion.173 Similar issues of regulatory accountability will arise in democratic developing countries
1 See Brennan & Boyd, supra note 12, at 49-50; Pierce, supra note 72 at 2034. Especially since the 1978 passage of a federal law permitting competition, electrical
utilities have been on notice that increased competition was likely. Similar inferences
would seem reasonable in telecommunications, at least since the breakup of AT&T.
Among the stakeholders in the industries involved, it is the private firms who seem to
have disparate political power, not other concerned groups, such as residential consumers.
1 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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for infrastructure projects operating under regulatory statutes. In
general, such countries need to improve the quality of their admin-

istrative processes to make them both more dependent on
technical expertise and more open and transparent to the citizens
and firms interested in the outcome. A takings doctrine cannot
generate such developments on its own. The administrative process
should be a separate focus of reform. In the absence of procedural

safeguards, however, courts could impose a higher burden of proof
on the state to demonstrate that it is acting as an accountable poli-

cymaker as opposed to a purchaser. The distinction between
government as purchaser and government as policymaker might be
influenced by the process used to determine the government's
choice.

This last proposal, however, only makes sense if a government
has an underlying commitment to popular sovereignty and accountable government so that the executive is likely to respond to
a finding of procedural deficiency by seeking to reform the process.174 This is unlikely to be the case in countries with undemocratic
constitutions or autocratic traditions. In those cases, takings law
should not be used to encourage administrative reform since the
doctrine is unlikely to generate real change on its own.
As a way of understanding our skepticism about the use of takings law as a hammer to induce reform in undemocratic or weak
states, consider a takings doctrine that requires the state to pay
compensation when it acts as a policymaker. If takings law were to

cover these cases, consistency implies a doctrine of "reverse takings." In other words, the government should claim reimbursement

from individuals or firms that receive windfalls from government
actions. " Such claims are not part of American constitutional ju-

4 In the United States, the failure to establish fair procedures could implicate the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution as well as the Takings Clause. In one recent
case, the Justices split on whether a retroactive conferral of greater benefits on retired
coal employees constituted a taking or violated due process. The Court struck down a
1992 law, but its majority was split between four votes for a takings violation
(Rehnquist, C.J. and O'Connor, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ.), see Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), and one vote for a due process violation (Kennedy, J.),
see id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
75See

Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 Yale L.J. 1489,1494-501 (1999).
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risprudence, 6 yet they are a logical extension of the argument that
compensation should be paid when policymaking activities harm
some groups. Of course, a windfall tax would be difficult to administer since it would require government to distinguish between
fairly and unfairly earned profits, impose high administrative costs,
introduce the possibility of government mistakes, and raise investor uncertainty. The principle, however, is clear. For the reasons
outlined above, we do not support this extension of takings law either in developed countries such as the United States or in
developing countries with weak legal and political institutions.
Rather than set up conditions that restrict government actions to
those that benefit all property owners, we believe that govern-

ments need the flexibility to set policies that impose both benefits
and costs. Those dissatisfied with the outcome should resort to the
political process. If the political process is unresponsive, this is a
troubling result, but it cannot be remedied through the quick fix of
requiring compensation for all state-administered costs.
CONCLUSION

We have outlined what seems to us to be a reasonable constitutional takings doctrine that could be applied both within and
outside of the American context. Whenever the government acts as

the buyer of a particular asset, it should pay compensation at "fair
market value." The courts would be the final arbiter of this value

based on data from private market activity. When the goverument
is best characterized as a policymaker, compensation should not be
the general rule. Government policies that influence market rates
of return would not give rise to takings claims unless the government plans to use the private property in its existing form or unless
risk-averse individuals would demand insurance that is unavailable
in the private market. The doctrine thus balances some certainty
for investors against the preservation of government policy flexibil-

ity. The government should pay compensation whenever it takes
resources as part of the process of producing public goods and services. However, there would be a rebuttable presumption against

176

But see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 399-400 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that regulatory givings should be factored into the takings equation).
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compensation for losses connected with the overall implementa-

tion of a public policy-however misguided or predatory.
The United States provides an illustration of a highly developed
country whose constitution leaves open a wide range of regulatory

and policy options. We do not recommend adoption of all of the
details of the United States system, but it should reassure countries
that flexible rules can be consistent with growth if the government

is otherwise viewed as accountable and legitimate. In the American context, federal court review of public utility deregulation

should not depart from the distinct line of cases addressing public
utility price regulation. These cases suggest deference to regulators' decisions regarding compensation, given the democratic
political process behind regulatory reform and the relative wealth
and power of investors claiming injury. In our view, the courts

should treat the deregulation of public utilities as an exercise of
government policymaking authority that does not require compen-

sation of "stranded costs" under the United States Constitution.
The only exception would be for clearly uneconomic investments
required by government policy objectives, such as the encouragement of alternative energy sources.
In countries with well-established democracies, a demonstration
that the administrative structure was not fair and transparent could
generate a claim for compensation under regulatory laws. We
would only recommend this extension of takings law in the small
number of countries where it is plausible to think that such claims

will help generate reform. Such subtleties are likely to be beyond
the capacity of most countries' courts and to provide only weak incentives for reform in predatory states. Regimes with a strong
commitment to reform should not put their energies into refining a
takings doctrine beyond a basic rule requiring compensation for

inputs. Takings law is a weak tool for protecting property rights in
infrastructure under changing political conditions. Reformers
should instead focus on more fundamental weaknesses in political
institutions and should promote the enforcement of contracts, including those to which the state is a party.

Officials in developing countries who are eager for foreign investment need to look far enough ahead to ask if the generous
terms they are offering to investors will backfire in the future when
citizens perceive the costs they must bear. This concern ought to
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temper the officials' support of either very strong guarantees of
compensation for future state actions or of contract terms that
leave too little flexibility to the state to respond to future conditions. In the privatization of infrastructure, this may mean that a
country accepts some reduction in the sales prices of public firms in
return for the preservation of policy options. Property rights protection will not aid growth if it encourages inefficient levels and
types of investment. Developing countries should be wary of in-

corporating too sweeping a set of protections into constitutions,
individual contracts, or investment treaties, especially if they are

still in the process of developing effective state institutions.
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